

The History of North Africa

Book two
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**From Greek and Roman
Influence to
Byzantine and Vandal
Impact on North Africa**

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From Greek and Roman Influence to Byzantine and Vandal Impact on North Africa

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Introduction

The Greek colonization of north Africa had to come to terms with an organized and strong indigenous society in Egypt, and were consequently obliged to serve or to exploit and ultimately to take over the indigenous state structure. But in the rest of north Africa the less populous, less organized and less advanced people, they were more easily pushed aside by the Greek colonists who established their own state systems.

The war between Carthage and the Romans had not merely ended in the defeat of Carthaginian power in the battle of Zama in 202 B.C., but had made Roma so conscious of her strength, and given rise to such a development of the spirit of militarism and imperialism among the Romans that they had firmly established their predominance over the Eastern

Greek world as well. The complete failure of Carthaginian power can in no way be blamed on the Carthaginian leader (The greatest of all) Hannibal who with unshaken patriotism, until his death, employed all the resources of his genius in Itself whose tenacious resistance was marvelous considering the forces at his command. There were immensely superior to these of the Hellenic powers even though in many respects the Greeks were in a much more favorable position. The failure was due to the strength of the Romans, to the political-military organization of the Italic confederation and to the almost superhuman spirit of sacrifice exhibited by the Italians during the war.

However, Roman prejudice and hatred continued until agitation for the destruction of Carthage had been inspired and directed by the 83 year old Cato

who was convinced that the security of Roma depended on the annihilation of Carthage.

Indeed, the main motive behind the destruction of Carthage was actually fear of an economically resurgent Carthage; fear of a city, which had every reason to hate Roma. Cato also opposed the spread of any new culture and regarded the family as the germ of the state. He proved himself a hard husband, a strict father as well as a severe and cruel master.

When the Romans finally destroyed Carthage, bodies festooned the tortured city, young and old, male and female were dumped uncovered in hollows, sprawled on footways or protruded from among crumbled and charred beams.

Indeed, the treatment of conquered Carthage will always be remembered as the most terrible example of the total annihilation of a nation. The city was burnt

to ashes, the ruins razed to the very foundations, the soil was scattered with salt, survivors were sold into slavery, and even the gods were taken to Rome on the promise of being worshipped there if they would care to abandon their Carthaginian adherents.

By the time that the Romans defeated Carthage and expanded their empire into north Africa, the Libyan and Berber foundations of culture had already been widely overlaid by Punic influence. So, at first, the extension of Roman dominion in Africa was restricted to northern and eastern Tunisia which became the province of Africa Vetus, and its purpose was simply to prevent a revival of Carthaginian power. As a result, the resistance of Berber chieftains and the ambitions of Roman commanders and land speculators led inevitably to wider conquest: so the city of Tripolitania was soon added to the province of

Africa Nova, and in 79 B.C. Cyrenaica became a separate province to which the island of Crete was added a few years later.

In 25 B.C., the emperor Augustus united Tunisia and Tripolitania into the enlarged province of Africa proconsularies, and at the same time annexed the Berber chiefdoms of eastern Algeria to form the province of Numidia. And in 46 AD the emperor Claudius created in western Algeria and Morocco the provinces of Mauritania Caesariensis and Mauritania Tingitana and the Roman occupation of north Africa was complete.

In fact this African Empire had no meaning or unity of its own. It was essentially no more than the southern limit of the Mediterranean world which the Romans had mastered, but the greatest contribution of the Roman empire to Africa was the largely

incidental fact that by bringing northern Africa so positively within the sphere of Mediterranean civilization, it greatly facilitated the spread of Christianity which in the 4th, 5th and 6th centuries of its existence became increasingly the state religion of the Roman empire.

However, Egypt and the provinces of Africa and Numidia opposed the Roman rule by seeking sectarian divergences.

In 429 A.D the vandals who had recently invaded Spain, were invited to assist in quelling a series of Berber revolts that were undermining the failing authority of Rome. The vandals did their job so well that in 10 years they had dispossessed the Romans throughout most of North Africa and were in command of Carthage.

The century of Vandal occupation did not, however, bring about any significant cultural change, and in 533 the Byzantine general Belisarius successfully reconquered the lost north African provinces, where the declining Roman tradition was upheld for another century until the Arab conslaught burst upon the Maghreb from the east.

Part one
The Greek colonization of
North Africa

Chapter one

Introduction

A sketch of Greek history is not possible in the same series in which one can sketch Roman history. In fact, Greece in ancient times was never a nation, it never had a capital, a government or a single ruling element. The typical Greek-speaking sovereign state was a tribe cultivating an area of land separated from the next cultivable area by a range of rocky hills or mountains; there were, hundreds of communities of this kind in Greece.

City and city state may seem misleading ways of translating the Greek term (polis) for independent sovereign community because so few of those communities had a concentration of population of a size that we would nowadays call a city.

It would be more troublesome to use one word for big sovereign communities, another for small ones, and argue over what we should call the middle-sized.

It was clear that the Greeks had taken a long time for what they achieved; they certainly did not create ancient civilization, and as comparatively late arrivals on the ancient scene they did not lack respect for what they found already there. When Aristotle composed his work upon the constitutions of the Greek states, he found it necessary to extend his survey to no less than 158 states.

Greek colonization:

It was believed that the area occupied by the Greek race extended from the Pyrenees to the Caucasus, and from southern Russia to northern Africa . The period of the Greek colonization extended from the middle of the 8th to the middle of the 6th century. The

colonization was merely a continuation of the process which at an earlier epoch had led to the settlement, first of Cyprus, and then of the islands and coasts of the Aegean.

It would be a mistake to regard Greek colonization as commercial in origin, they were in all cases established as trading-posts. The typical Greek colony was neither in origin nor in development a mere trading-post; it was, or it became a polis (a city-state) in which was reproduced the life of the parent state. The Greek colonization was not like the emigration from Europe to America and Australia in the 19th century (simply the result of over-population); the causes were as various as those which can be traced in the history of modern colonization; those which were established for the purposes of trade; maybe compared to the factories of the Portuguese and Dutch

in Africa and Far East, other were the result of political discontent; others again were due to ambition or the mere love of a venture. But various the causes, there were two conditions which must always be presupposed: an expansion of commerce and a growth of population.

The Greek colony was completely independent from the first, and the ties that united a colony to its metropolis were those of sentiment and interest, and the political tie did not exist although there were exception .

Chapter two

The Greek invasion of north Africa

In Sicily and elsewhere in the northern half of the Mediterranean, Greek colonies were competing with the Phoenicians, but the Carthaginians successfully kept them out of north Africa west of the Gulf of Surt. It was only in Cyrenaica and Egypt that the Greeks were able to secure a footing in north Africa. In Egypt, the Greeks had to come to terms with an organized and strong indigenous society, and were consequently obliged to serve or exploit, and ultimately to take over the indigenous state structure; but in Libya, the Libyans who were less populous, less organized and less advanced were more easily pushed aside by the colonists who established their own state systems.

According to Herodotus(Greek historian called the Father of History 484-425 B.C .It is probable that Herodotus shared his relative's political opinions)the story began when Battus was bidden by the Delphic oracle to lead a portion of the Greek citizens to Libya and build a city in a place between waters; the reason for this was generally considered to be drought on Thera island(a volcanic island in the Aegean Sea, the southernmost of the Sporades) which led king Battus to found a new colony. The first move was in 640-639 B.C. when the king sent out a small number of colonists to establish a settlement in north Africa. They settled first on the off-shore island of Platea(an ancient Greek city of Boeotia) in the gulf of Bomba. Two years later, the Greek colonists moved to Aziris on the mainland opposite (30 km. east of Dama). And by 631 B.C., the colonists moved to a better site

further west. They were guided by the Giligamai (Libyan tribe) who brought them to high ground from various points of which issued springs; and the result was Cyrene, named from a local Nymph the mother of Aristaeus by Apollo from which the name Cyrenaica derived .

The Libyans robbed in favour of the new settlers, and the colonists began to expand their colonies in the western portion of the cultivable littoral of Cyrenaica; as a result there were other settlements such as Apollonia (Marsa Susa) which served as the port of Cyrene, and on the coast further west there were Ptolemeta (Tolmeta) and Taucheira (Tocra), and the city of Barce(El-Marj) in the hinterland of Ptolemais.(Barce founded in the middle of 6th century B.C. and became a rival of Cyrene and gave its name to the west of Cyrene's territory).

Ptolemais and Taucheira became dependencies of Barce there also another independent city was founded further along the coast at Euhesperides (Benghazi) .

(1)

The Greek colonies in North Africa

In the Libyan history, Cyrenaica was sometimes referred to as the Pentapolis (the five cities). Those five being Cyrene, Apollonia, Ptolemais Taucheira and Euhesperides .

The great Cyrene:

Cyrene was the original capital of ancient Cyrenaica and one of the greatest Greek colonies. The site was lying on the crest of the highland of Jabal Al-Akhdar (1,800 ft.) and 17 miles from the sea, and its ground slopes gradually south. The northward of the site falls more steeply in a succession of shelves, covered here

and there with forest, and ravines surround the site on three sides and of the springs in its area.

It was believed that the great attraction at all times was the so called Fount of Apollo which issued from a tunnel artificially enlarged and was about 300 yards long extremely tortuous.

After the colonization of the western portion of the cultivable littoral of Cyrenaica by the Greeks, they went further west for more colonies but these were frustrated by the opposition of the Carthaginians who were already established in the area. The great border rivalry between the Carthaginians in the west and the Greeks of Cyrene in the east erupted into bitter war in the middle of the 4th century B.C., and finally the two sides agreed that the boundary between them should be set at the meeting point of two Greek athletes and

two Carthaginian athletes who were to set out from their respective cities on the same day.

Carthage chose the Philaeni brothers who met their rivals in the Syrtic desert, easily covering the greater amount of ground, but the Greeks accused the Philaeni of cheating by leaving Carthage before the agreed date, and to ensure that the race was held again made a proposal that in their own minds they were sure would be rejected. They offered to settle the boundary line there only if the Carthaginians would agree to be buried alive on the spot.

The brothers agreed, and an altar and tomb to them were erected by their grateful compatriots.

The Greek interests in Cyrenaica were primarily agricultural but not commercial. Nevertheless, they developed a considerable external trade and from the very early times Cyrene maintained commercial

contacts both with Greece and with Naukratis in Egypt. At the beginning, the Greeks were able to export corn, wool and ox-hides to the Greek world, then they began to trade with the Libyans but that was after the discovery of the mysterious plant called Silphion whose root served a variety of culinary and medicinal purposes (the plant grew only in Cyrenaica, but it disappeared during Roman times, and it grew in the desert margins to the south of the Greek territory in the Libyan areas, and the roots were collected by the Libyans who sold them to the Greeks, but later the king of Cyrene endeavoured to exercise a monopoly of the trade in Silphion. As a result the Libyan began to sell the plant in secret to the Carthaginians who exported it to the Mediterranean world).

The Greeks in Cyrenaica

The history of the Greeks in Cyrenaica began with the founder and first king of Cyrene Aristoteles who later assumed the title Battus (Libyan word for king which his descendants adopted as personal name). Aristoteles Battus began his reign in 631 B.C. and lasted for forty years (599 B.C.), then was succeeded by his son Arkesilas who reigned for another 16 years (583 B.C.). In fact, Cyrene during the reign of Aristoteles and his son was a small settlement, and the people were concentrating on agriculture rather than anything else. Under Battus 2nd (the third king) in 583 B.C., a fresh band of settlers was invited from Greece, but there was a flood of immigrants from Crete and the Aegean islands as well as from the Peloponnese on the Greek mainland.

When king Battus 2nd invited the Greek immigrants, he promised them allotments of land or work, but this raised some problems such as the difficulty of integrating the newcomers with the descendants of the original Theraean settlers, and the land had to be taken from the local Libyans of Asbystai to provide for the new settlers. The Libyans felt that they have been robbed in favour of the new settlers, therefore, they appealed for aid to the Egyptian king Wahibre. The Egyptian king sent an army west to fight the Greeks who at the same time marched eastwards to meet them, but the Greeks defeated them at Irasa in 570 B.C.

The Cyrenaean rule was extended once more over a considerable area of the interior, and the security of the Greek estates protected by the construction of

fortified farmhouses around the small villages developed.

Battus 2nd was succeeded by his son Arkesilas 2nd whose reign was beset by troubles which he inherited from his father, and he was facing internal and external problems; the external one was the Libyan problem which he inherited from his father, and the internal one was a division at Cyrene.

Arkesilas 2nd could not cope with the new situation in Cyrene, and he quarreled with his four brothers who later left Cyrene and founded their own city away to the west at Barce. In the meantime, the Greek dissidents at Barce incited the discontented Libyan tribe of Asbystai to revolt again against Cyrene. As a result Arkesilas 2nd marched against the Libyans who withdrew eastwards drawing Arkesilas 2nd and his

army into the desert and finally defeated the Greeks completely at Leukon.

Later on, Arkesilas 2nd was murdered by his brother Laarchos who afterwards seized power in Cyrene and obtained a force of Egyptian soldiers from king Ahmose to support himself in power.

To prevent any internal division and to consolidate his position in Cyrene, he married Arkesilas's widow Eryxo and adopting the young Battus as his own son, but he was murdered by Eryxo and her brother Polyarchos.

When the king of Egypt Ahmose heard news, he planned to take action against Cyrene, but he was pacified by a visit of Eryxo and Polyarchos to Egypt and induced to acquiesce in the succession of Battus. Subsequently king Ahmose maintained friendly relations with Cyrene.

Under Battus 3rd, constitutional reforms were effected at Cyrene in an attempt to prevent a repetition of these troubles. The royal house had forfeited its popularity by its excesses, and the king was now reduced to purely religious functions.

In the meantime, effective power passed to a council and elected magistrates drawn from the richer citizens; moreover, the descendants of the non-Theraean settlers who had come to Cyrene under Battus 2nd were brought into the citizen body on the same terms as the Theraeans. But Battus's son Arkesilas 3rd who was supported by his mother Pheretima did not accept the new reforms and claimed the old royal powers. Therefore, he left Cyrene after he gathered an army of adventurers from Greece by promising grants of land. With his force he recovered power in Cyrene; and gained alliance with Barce

which was ruled by Alazeir who was the father in-law of Arkesilas.

When the Persians conquered Egypt, Arkesilas 3rd and Alazeir sent gifts to the Persian king to signify their submission, and the Greek cities of Cyrenaica became tributary to Persia. But the people of Barce did not accept the tributary to Persia which led to a revolt against Alazeir; as a result Arkesilas 3rd retired to the protection of Alazeir at Barce, leaving Cyrene under his mother Pheretime, but at Barce both Arkesilas 3rd and Alazeir were assassinated.

Pheretime, however, appealed for aid to Aryandes (the Persian satrap of Egypt) who took the opportunity to strengthen Persian influence in Cyrenaica and provided her with an army. Finally the Persians besieged and captured Barce, and a large part of the population of Barce was carried off into

slavery by the Persians. When the Persians decided to invade Greece, Pheretima refused to supply forces for the Persians, therefore, the city was besieged and captured by the Persians, but after the defeat of the Persians in Greece in 479 B.C. the Greeks of Cyrenaica recovered their independence.

Pheretima was succeeded by Vattus 4th, and then by Arkesilas 4th who had to suppress a popular rising in Cyrene, and killed many of his opponents, he also recruited mercenaries in Greece and sent them as colonists to Euhesperides for himself in case of trouble at Cyrene, and he was finally assassinated at Cyrene. It was believed that after the assassination of Arkesilas 4th, constitutional reforms of a democratic character were effected at Cyrene, but the reforms did not establish a stable political regime which continued to suffer periodically from bitter internal dissensions.

In 401 B.C. Ariston (popular leader in Cyrene) seized control of the city by executing and expelling many of the more prominent citizens, but the exiles procured an army of adventurers from Greece and once more attacked Cyrene, and after considerable bloodshed a peaceful settlement was arranged and the exiles were readmitted to the city.

The relative isolation of Cyrenaica was ended when the Greek army under Alexander occupied Egypt in 332 B.C., and soon after the occupation Cyrene sent envoys to offer alliance which was accepted by Alexander, but Cyrene did not become subject to Alexander.

Seven years later (325 B.C.) a large force of Greek mercenaries commanded by a Spartan adventurer called Thibron arrived in Cyrenaica with the encouragement of some Cyrenaean exiles seized

Apollonia (Cyrenaean port) and began extorting money and armaments from the Greek cities on the pretext of mounting a campaign against the local Libyans who were fighting for their independence from the foreigners. Cyrene, submitted at first but the Cyrenaicans summoned assistance from the local Libyans as well as Carthage, they began to resist the Thibron . But Thibron secured the alliance of Barce and Euheperides and laid siege to Cyrene .

Protracted fighting followed, but soon a civil war broke out in Cyrene which finally ended in a victory for the democratic party and the expulsion of the richer citizens in Cyrene, but these richer citizens appealed for aid to Ptolemy 1st in Egypt who sent his general Ophellas(a Macedonian nobleman of Eordaea ;also he was one of Alexander the Great's most trusted generals , and among the seven bodyguards attached

to his person) with a large army into Cyrenaica in 322 B.C. The democrats of Cyrene made common cause with Thibron against Ophellas, but Ophellas defeated them and other cities as well, and the richer citizens took over once more, meanwhile Ptolemy secured control over Cyrenaica and the Loyalty of Cyrene to Ptolemy was guaranteed by the imposition of a large garrison, and general Ophellas remained in the city as the effective ruler.

Ten years later (312 B.C.) there was a rising at Cyrene, and Ptolemy's garrison was besieged in the citadel of the town, but Ptolemy sent reinforcements to suppress the revolt. Shortly after this, general Ophellas joined forces with the Cyrenaen nationalists and declared himself independent of Ptolemy.

In 308 B.C. general Ophellas marched west to join Agathokles of Syracuse (Sicily today) in his attack on

Carthage, but he was murdered by Agathokles, and the rule of Ophellas at Cyrene came to an end when Ptolemy appointed his own stepson Magas as its governor.

Magas ruled Cyrene over 30 years, and in 274 B.C. he took advantage of the embroilment of Ptolemy 2nd (Philadelphos) in a war with Syria to declare himself an independent king. Magas remained independent at Cyrene which he ruled until his death in 258 B.C., but before his death he became reconciled to Ptolemy Philadelphos and arranged for the eventual reunion of Cyrene to Egypt by betrothing his daughter Berenice to Ptolemy's son (who called Ptolemy 3rd Euergetes).

There was opposition to his policy in Cyrene which led to a period of internal strife, and Berenice was driven out of Cyrene and a republican regime again established under the guidance of two revolutionary

agitators from the mainland Greece, Ekdemos and Megalophanes (they were students of the Platonic at Athens).

Few years later, about 248 B.C., the republic was quickly suppressed and Ptolemy Euergetes and Berenice maintained their control over Cyrenaica without difficulty. Cyrenaica became firmly attached to the Ptolemaic realm and was governed by a viceroy, entitled the Libyarches (governor of Libya), sent out from Egypt. Moreover, the Cyrenaean forces (Greeks and Libyans) served with the Ptolemaic army.

(3)
Reasons behind Greek migration
to North Africa

The people of the ancient world did not solve the problem of existence on the same lines. It was natural that a race which lived in a region where the natural conditions were hard, and means of living peculiarly precarious should seek to conquer lands where the conditions were more favourable. This had been at the root of the great movements of peoples at various periods in the ancient history from the comparatively inhospitable lands of central and northern Asia to the more fertile and more favoured regions of Europe and parts of western Asia as well as northern Africa.

The invaders drove in front of them the original inhabitants of the regions which they seized, and these in their turn forced their way into regions in which

· they had not dwelt aforetime. These movements were
· peculiarly prominent in the history of the Greek
people, but in various recorded instances such
invaders did not expel or massacre the population of
the region ,they occupied but constituted themselves
as a superior class which kept the original population
in a position of quasiserfdom as tillers of the soil.
In other cases the invaders merged with the invaded,
· and in many cases they expelled or exterminated
· them.

Early Greek life in North Africa:

It is perhaps impossible to realize the life of the average Greek, but for the majority of Greeks life was passed in days of work on the land, ploughing, sowing and reaping the corn crops, tending the vineyards and olive groves. The Greek people as a whole were very unsophisticated, very impressionable and very superstitious, they were singularly conservative of the superstitions of religion and quite ready to kill anyone who slighted or seemed to slight their age-old religious beliefs.

The intellectual life was lived by the learned few, the sophists or teachers, and those who had money enough and leisure to attend their lectures, but the mass of the Greek people went its own way doing its daily work getting as much enjoyment as possible out

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of life but not worrying itself about abstract questions
of a philosophical nature (the discussion of which it
could not afford to hear).

(5)

Libyan-Greek relations

The Libyans and Greeks did not always meet as
enemies and on some occasions the Libyans were
found in alliance with the Greeks as with Cyrene
against Thibron in the 320s B.C.

The contingents of war-chariots which served with the
armies of Cyrene and Barce in the 5th and 4th centuries
B.C. were provided by Libyan allies. There was also a
considerable absorption of Libyan elements into the
population of the Greek states and it became quite
normal for Greek men to take Libyan wives.

The Libyan element in the population of the Greek
cities had some impact on their culture and some

Greeks adopted Libyan names as had been noted that the royal name Battus was of Libyan origin as well as Arkesilas 3rd and Alazeir (the name of the ruler of Barce)

Libyan influence on the Greeks was also most evident in the sphere of religion. The women of Cyrene celebrated the festivals of the Egyptian goddess Isis, also the prohibition on the meat of cows which were sacred to Isis. Women of Barce also observed the Egyptian prohibition on the eating of pork. These Egyptian customs came to the Greeks through the Libyans. It was clear that Libyan influence was strongest among women of the cities, and was stronger at Barce than at Cyrene .

The most important of all which the Greeks adopted from Libyans was the god Ammon (a version of the Egyptian god Amun-Re) in origin a fusion of the sun-

god Re with the ram-god Amun who was often represented as a ramheaded man. The principal centre of the cult of Ammon was his temple in the oasis of Siwa. The cult was widespread among the Libyan tribes further west.

The Greeks identified Ammon with their own principal god Zeus and worshipped him in their own cities as Zeus Ammon who was usually represented as a man with a ram's horns and representations of Zeus Ammon were a favourite device on the coins of Cyrene, Barce and Euhesperides. Moreover, from the Greek cities of Cyrenaica the cult of Zeus Ammon spread to the rest of the Greek world.

The Cyrenaica passion for chariot-racing was influenced by the local Libyans. Herodotus said that the Greeks learned from the Libyans the technique of using teams of four horses for chariots. Beyond this it

can only be hoped that clearer evidence of Libyan influence of the Greeks or vice versa will be obtained when archaeology succeeds in recovering the material remains of the Libyan tribes .

Part two

**The Romans in
north Africa**

Introduction

In fact Roman history does not appear in a concrete literacy form until about 200 B.C. when the annalists who began to write it were dependent on scanty written records belonging to the period of the republic and apart from these on the oral traditions of the Roman people.

For the early centuries of the city's existence and for her foundation these legends and the speculations of Greek writers about the new power that was rising in the west, were all the annalists had to guide them, and like all such stories they were more interesting as evidence of fertile imagination than of historical truth. But unfortunately we have only the Roman version of what happened between the Carthaginians and the Romans.

Until the beginning of the 3rd century B.C. Italy had played no active part in the Mediterranean politics, and it was felt throughout the Mediterranean world that a new power had arisen and Rome (as the head and representative of Italy) found herself irresistibly drawn into the vortex of Mediterranean affairs.

Egypt sought her alliance and the Greek scholars began to interest themselves keenly in the history but the Romans looked naturally westwards rather than eastwards. The western coasts of the peninsula were the most fertile and populous and wealthy and it was in this direction that the natural openings for Italian commerce were to be found, moreover, it was precisely on this side that Rome had serious ground for anxiety.

The appearance of Rome on the International level:

On the death of Agathocles tyrants sprang up in various cities and Acragas under its king Phintias won for the moment somewhat of its old greatness and by a new depopulation of Gela(it was a town of Sicily on the south coast) he founded the youngest of Siceliot cities (Phintias) at the mouth of the southern Himera. In the meantime Messana was seized by the disbanded Campanian mercenaries of Agathocles (282 B.C.) Who proclaimed themselves a new people in a new city by the name of Mamertines (children of Mamers or Mars). The Campanian occupation of Messana was the first of the chain of events which led to the Roman dominion in Sicily .

Pyrrhus the king of Epirus came as the champion of the western Greeks against all barbarians whether Romans in Italy or Carthaginians in Sicily. In 281

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B.C. Tarentum (in southern Italy) asked his assistance
against Rome; Pyrrhus went with some 25,000 men
with more whole-hearted assistance from the Greek
cities met the Romans at Heraclea. Pyrrhus, with the
advantage gained by his cavalry and elephants,
completely defeated the Roman consul M. Valerius
Leavinus. He advanced on Rome through Latium but
the towns were all garrisoned, and the senate were
inclined to agree to terms; as a result Cineas
(Pyrrhus's minister) was sent back with a refusal to
negotiate as long as Pyrrhus troops were in Italy.

In 279 B.C. Pyrrhus won another victory at Asculum
in Apulia. He then went to Sicily with the idea of
driving the Carthaginians out, and his military
operations were successful, therefore, Rome and
Carthage united in an alliance against him while
depotic methods alienated the Sicilian cities. Pyrrhus

stayed three years in Sicily and then returned to Italy, but the Greek cities entirely failed to support him and he was completely defeated at Beneventum in 275 B.C.; here Pyrrhus said " what a battlefield I'm leaving to Rome and Carthage".

Chapter one

Rome and Carthage

Relations between Rome and Carthage were traditionally good and when Rome had freed itself from the Etruscans at the end of the sixth century B.C. by expelling the Tarquins, Carthage thought it best not to leave a breach in its circle of alliances enclosing Greece. A treaty was signed, and was renewed on several occasions which provided clauses regulating the economic interests of the two parties who were the only great civilized powers in the western Mediterranean.

The main concern of the Carthaginians was to maintain their empire as a trade monopoly. This policy was illustrated by the treaties made between Carthage and Rome in 509 B.C. and 348 B.C. In the first, in return for the recognition by Carthage of

Roman interests in central Italy, the Romans undertook not to sail along the coast of Africa west of Carthage unless forced to do so by weather or enemy action, and if so forced, not to trade, but to leave within five days. The Romans could however, trade in the rest of north Africa and in Sardinia though" only in the presence of an official".

Romans had equal rights of trade with Carthaginian citizens only in Carthage itself and in the Carthaginian province in Sicily .

The treaty of 348 B.C. forbade the Romans to sail south of a point on the Spanish coast and barred them completely from Sardinia and north Africa allowing them to trade only in Carthage Sicily.

In 279 B.C. an agreement was made between Rome and Carthage for the resistance to Pyrrhus, and in 272 B.C. when the Romans were besieging Tarentum, a

Carthaginian fleet approached the harbour of that city to support the Roman forces.

The war of 264 B.C. between the two major Mediterranean powers (Rome and Carthage):

The incident which led to war between the two major Mediterranean powers was similar to that which had brought Athens and Sparta face to face in Sicily .

In 265 B.C. Hieron 2nd commanding the Syracusans, defeated the Mamertines and was declared king of Syracuse. The Mamertines sent out tow appeals for help, one to Carthage and the other to Rome.

Carthage promptly sent an officer to Messansa, but the Romans hesitated and after long deliberation the Roman senate reached no decision. The appeal was referred to the assembly which decided to send a

consular army to Messina and this was that amount to going to war.

The Roman had long wanted Messina as a military base in Sicily and they were unwilling to see the Carthaginians in control of the city the dominated the all-important strait between Sicily and Italy.

The Carthaginians arrived first upon the scene occupied Messina and effected a reconciliation with the Syracusans . Later the Romans put their troops ashore and seized the Carthaginian admiral which led to open war between the two states. It should come as no surprise that Rome was the aggressor in the war, for since her recovery from the Callic sack she had sought constantly and successfully to enlarge her territory. Sometimes, as in the Latin war, she had been on the defensive; sometimes her intervention had been invited, for instance, by Thurii in 282 B.C. but

the steady extension of Roman authority indicates that aggressive expansionism was the usual attitude of the Romans and war was her natural response. In 264 B.C. Rome accepted the Mamertine appeal because she needed Messana as a base for her aggression in Sicily, and in 261 B.C. she continued the war to try and conquer the whole of Sicily.

Chapter two

The outbreak of first Punic War

It was called Punic war because the Romans always referred to the Carthaginians as “Poeni” which means Phoenicians. However, the intervention of both powers in a quarrel between the Mamertines (a body of Campanian mercenaries who had occupied Messana) and Hieron 2nd of Syracuse led to the outbreak of war between Rome and Carthage in 264 B.C. Carthage and Rome each responded with forces to reinforce Messana's garrison . The Carthaginian leader Hanno had no order to initiate a war and decided to withdraw in favour of the Romans. In spite of the Carthaginian reticence, hostilities escalated when the Roman commander persisted in throwing troops into the city and later decided to seize the Carthaginian troops.

The object of the original dispute was quickly secured by the Romans but their aggression met a declaration of war from Carthage and the two principal Greek cities in Sicily (Syracuse and Akragas). There followed a joint attack upon Messana and the Romans were repelled .

In 263 B.C. the Romans advanced with a considerable force into Hiero's territory and induced him to seek peace and alliance with them . Having secured their foothold on the island, they set themselves to wrest it completely from Carthage.

Hiero who made peace with the Romans was confirmed by them in his position as king of Syracuse and the fertile region around it and he signed a fifteen years alliance with them. His defection gave Rome control of the east coast and encouraged other

Siceliots to come to terms with her. This left Carthage no option but to mobilize her full forces.

The war between the two powers produced the heaviest casualties ever known in the history of mankind and led to radical strategic innovation on both sides. Never before had Carthage's dependence on a hired army been tested against an enemy with so vast a reserve of fighting men and such efficiency of mobilization. On the other hand, Rome was impeded by the lack of a navy and maritime tradition. In early 262 B.C. the Romans deployed four legions on Agragas (an easterly puny base) and five months later the full mercenary army of Carthage arrived in Sicily. Its strength is uncertain but events suggest it was fairly well matched against the Romans at Agragas. Neither the Carthaginian commander Hanno nor the Roman consuls besieging the city were eager to give battle and

the opposing armies faced each other inactively for fully two months while conditions in Agragas deteriorated and the siege force itself suffered. Finally signals from the garrison notifying the critical plight of the citizens prompted the Punic general to action. Tactically, Agragas was a Roman victory especially when Hanno retired from a day-long battle in moderate order but clearly not the winner.

Strategically, the outcome was more complex for Carthage when the engagement enabled the garrison of Agragas to evacuate without loss. As a result, the Roman commanders (L. Postumius Megellus and Q. Mamilius Vitulus) sacked the city and enslaved its Siceliot occupants. This action changed the mood of the Siceliot communities who gave valuable help to the Romans. They now clearly favour the Carthaginians,

thus far from exploiting the victory over Hanno, the Romans lost support.

Lack of success in the campaigns of 261 B.C. forced the Romans to realise that without a fleet of warships they could not attack the fortresses of western Sicily. The Romans therefore gave orders for a fleet of a hundred and twenty ships to be built. Their models were Greek and Punic including a Carthaginian quinquereme or five-banked vessel wrecked on the coast of southern Italy.

The Roman ships were heavier and slower than the sleek galleys of Carthage, but the Romans had resolved to make sea-fighting as much like land warfare as possible. They had equipped their ships with draw-bridges by which the legionaries on board could charge the crews of hostile vessels. These draw-bridges were four feet wide and 24 feet in effective

length, and were pivoted at the base of a special foremast which supported the operating mechanism. An unwieldy boom and pulley system connected by rope with the far end of the boarding-bridge and beneath the bottom edge there protruded a sharp spike to engage the deck of the enemy.

The first test of the new Roman navy was a fiasco. An advance force of 17 ships sent to the Sicilian theatre was challenged by 20 Carthaginian vessels among the Lipari Islands. The raw Roman crews, recruited from elements of the proletarii considered undesirable by land commanders, promptly deserted and the squadron surrendered without a blow being struck.

When the main Roman fleet appeared off northern Sicily, the Carthaginian commander of the naval forces Hannibal unwisely approached without caution and the two navies met off Mylae (not far from

Messana), with Carthage outnumbered in ships by the cumbersome Romans with their curious superstructures. The Romans were in two lines under the consul Caius Duilius with around 143 ships and as the swift Carthaginian vessels swung at them, the Romans manned their booms; however, unsuspectingly the Punic pack bore in on the first line of the Romans and violently the boarding-bridges smashed down and the metal beaks rammed home. The rearward Carthaginian ships veered aside as heavily-armed legionaries poured aboard the grappled leaders and some of Hannibal's galleys slipped through the first Roman line, but ran foul of the stabbing crows of the second line. By the time the startled Carthaginians broke away, 45 of their craft lost, mostly captured. For this the consulturned-admiral Duillius received unprecedented honours and

a column decorated with beaks of captured vessels was erected to him in the forum. This victory left Rome to land a force on Corsica and expel the Carthaginians but did not suffice to loosen their grasp on Sicily.

(1)

The Roman invasion of north Africa

After two years of desultory warfare the Romans decided to attack Carthage in Africa. Their early successes in Sicily had not brought the further gains expected and the cost of war was very heavy .

The African enterprise was therefore long planned and its resources were massive. There were an armada of 350 vessels and the warships jammed with legionaries and equipped with crews sailed from Ecnomus in Sicily for the southern continent in 256

B.C. Under Hamilcar and Hanno of Acragas, the Carthaginian fleet met the Roman armada between caps Ecnomus and westerly Haraclea. The Carthaginian fleet which consisted of 300 vessels was arrayed in a single line at right-angles to the coast stretching from inshore to far out to sea. When the Romans approached the vessels were in wedge formation, their leaders (the consuls Atilius and Manilius Vulso) aiming to bulldoze their way through the attenuated obstacle. Of the four war squadrons in the Roman armada, two formed the leading edges of the wedge and another completed the triangle in line at rear. Towing transports, the last followed in reserve. As the leading squadrons of the wedge accelerated to punch a gap in the Punic line, the Carthaginian vessels deliberately drew back urging the Roman oarsmen to greater speed which led to the

transport-towing squadron falling behind. At the same time, the wings of the Carthaginian line encircled the Roman flanks.

Hamilcar's manoeuvres had gone well. He had achieved the separation of the Roman fleet into three parts, and he placed his own squadrons in striking posts. While Hamilcar engaged the forward section of the Roman fleet with his central squadrons the Carthaginians left inshore swept toward the struggling tow-ships, the right (under Hanno) pounced from seaward on the Roman reserves. The tow-ships cut loose from the transports and may have resumed their position in the Roman wedge but the Carthaginians failed to take it in the rear, meanwhile, the reserve stood up beside the transports. The Carthaginians could not complete their advantage without drawing in range of the waiting crews but they were hesitant which led the

Romans to reinforce their fleet first by Regulus and then by Manilius. Eventually the Romans sunk 30 Carthaginian vessels and captured 64 against 24 of their own destroyed. Finally Rome had a second naval triumph to celebrate, more important the way was now open to Africa. The Romans landed unopposed at Clupea (Aspis), and Rome ordered the recall of Manilius Vulso leaving Regulus with 15,000 infantry, a smaller contingent of cavalry, and 40 ships.

At Carthage, the Carthaginians organized a defence force to oppose Regulus but the superiority of the disciplined Roman legions destroyed the Punic forces and Regulus seized Tunis and denied Carthage the interior.

Now Carthage's position was serious and uprisings had occurred among the tribes of the dependencies. The Numidians seized the opportunity to revolt

against their oppressors and Carthage was induced to open negotiations for peace with Regulus. However, the terms he presented to them were so outrageous, involving no less than the complete surrender of their sovereignty, that the Carthaginians rejected them and prepared to resist to the last. Fortunately, the sea gate was open and Carthage was able to retain the asset of her great wealth .

(2)

The massacre of Roman army in north Africa

In 255 B.C .a Spartan mercenary officer named Xanthippus took effective charge of the city's motley army. His army was in size the same as that of Regulus but while the Romans had no more than 500

horses, the Carthaginians had 4,000 and they also possessed 100 elephants.

Regulus dominated in infantry 15,000 men, but the Carthaginians had 12,000 men who were not necessarily inferior because they include the veteran mercenaries of Hamilcar and the Spartans and the greatest number were citizens trained by Xanthippus " who was inexperienced in war but high in motivation and intelligence ". The elephants led the Carthaginian advance by creating havoc in the dense ranks of the Roman army, in the meantime, the Carthaginian cavalry were brushing aside the small body of opposing horse and attacking the Romans in flank and rear: moreover, those of Regulus's legions who survived the elephants were faced with the unbroken ranks of the Punic infantry.

Encircled and disorganized the Romans were massacred .About 7,000 legionaries escaped to Aspis and Rgulus and a further 500 men were captured, and the rest of the Romans perished . News of Rgulus's defeat brought the Roman navy to the aid of the survivors holding out at Clupea . The fleet repulsed a smaller Punic fleet off cap Bon and lifted the remnants of the expedition and headed for Sicily. Between Ecnomus and cape Pachynus a violent storm drove the fleet on the rocks destroying more than 250 vessels killing about 100,000 men.

Despite the failure of the invasion of north Africa the Romans did not lose their faith in sea power. A new fleet was rapidly built to support land campaigns in Sicily and in 254 B.C. Panormus in Sicily was captured in an attack by land and sea and became a Roman headquarters.

second Roman attack on north Africa
and the destruction of Roman siege

In the following year a raid on the north African coast at Tripoli was carried out but it resulted in more heavy losses in a storm on the way home.

At this fresh evidence of the perils of war at sea the Romans began to lose heart, and in 250 B.C. the Carthaginian leader Hasdrubal led his forces against Panormus but his ineptitude in handling the elephants brought disaster upon his own men and many elephants were captured, and on his return to Carthage was put to death .

Gradually the Romans regained their confidence and they set about the task of reducing Lilybaeum (the Carthaginian's port in Sicily) and dispatched there two consular armies. With all devices of siege-warfare

ready, the Romans began their operation but the port was well defended by the Carthaginians and it could not be taken . The Carthaginian commander Himilco fought a brilliant and fierce defence and was able to drive the Romans back while the bastions were rebuilt a block for fresh attacks. Finally Himilco completely destroyed the Roman siege. The Carthaginians thereafter moved their headquarters to Drepana (a port about 25 miles north of Lilybaeum).

(4)

Great maritime war and the destruction Of Roman fleet

In 249 B.C. the Romans decided to destroy the Punic fleet at Drepana under the Carthaginian Admiral Adherbal. Claudius Pulcher (a consul in command of 120 ships) sailed to Drepana to bring the Carthaginian

fleet to battle. This plan was to enter the channel to the harbour before Adherbal could assemble his fleet, but in fact, Adherbal was ready for him and his plan was to lead them to the open sea by a second channel which he finally did. The Romans found Adherbal's fleet ranged to seaward penning them inshore and they had little chance. With every advantage of skill and disposition, the Carthaginians drove their enemies into the shallows where they ran aground. Claudius managed to escape along the coast with about 30 ships and the rest of his fleet floundered (90 ships were captured by the Carthaginians). A few days later the Romans sent Claudius's successor Junius Pulus who sailed from Syracuse with a large convoy of supplies for his western troops (about 800 transports and 120 warships). His convoy was intercepted by one of Adherbal's lieutenants

(Carthalo) but the promised action was forestalled by an approaching storm. Carthalo drove the Roman ships to take refuge close inshore then as a storm was approaching he doubled quickly round cape Pachynus into safe waters. The Romans (too slow or too complacent to follow) were caught on the lee-shore and most of the Roman ships were sunk .

All this was too much for the Roman authorities; fleet after fleet had met destruction at enormous cost.

**Carthage signed Peace treaty
with Rome**

In 243 B.C. the Romans built 200 ships and transferred them to Sicily under the consul Lutatius Catulus. Learning of the presence of the Roman fleet, the Carthaginian admiral Hanno planned to outsail it, disembark the supplies at Eryx, then with marines provided by Hamilcar, resume fighting trim, but Hanno underestimated the performance of the new Roman warships and when he challenged them off the Aegates islands, the Carthaginian ships were defenceless and finally 50 ships were sunk and 70 captured by the Romans, and the others turned tail. The action off the Aegates obliged Carthage to acknowledge the hopelessness of her position and finally they abandoned the island and signed a peace

treaty with Rome. The treaty included an indemnity of 3,200 talents payable to Rome over 20 years.

Indeed, Rome had extended her effort to the utmost but she was exhausted her greatest loss was in human life and in two decades her citizen population had decreased by something like 17 percent.

It had been a long struggle, on a huge scale, revealing the weakness of both sides as well as their strength.

The Carthaginians fought like tigers in defence of their homes, and the Romans showed hesitation and a tendency to wait and see what the Carthaginians would do but with more reason. Indeed, Rome must have been shocked and sickened at the appalling loss of life in the succession of naval disasters that befell the Roman fleet due to the consuls ignorance of bad-weather sailing.

What ultimately defeated Carthage was not any lack of martial ability but the immense numerical superiority of Roman and Italian troop reserves. They had resources unmatched in the world of the Mediterranean .

(6)

Carthage faces revolt in north Africa

In addition to these operations in Sicily, Carthage was involved in difficulties in her African territories. Early in 256 B.C. during the campaign of Regulus in Africa, Carthaginian territory was under constant attack by the Numidians, and in 247 B.C. a large Carthaginian army commanded by general Hanno operated in the interior and captured the town of Theveste (260 km. south-west of Carthage .

The loss of Sicily was followed by a crisis in Africa. Following the peace treaty between Carthage and Rome, the Carthaginian authorities attempted to disband the large army of mercenaries which had been employed in Sicily. These mercenaries consisted mainly of Libyans from the territory subject to Carthage but also included many Greeks, Italians and other nationalities. Mustered at Sicca in the interior to await payment, the soldiers mutinied, led by a Libyan called Mathos and an Italian called Spendios. This was followed by a general revolt of the Libyan subjects of Carthage who were resentful at the heavy taxation which had been imposed upon them during the war. Then the Numidians to the west of Carthaginian territory joined the revolt and the rebel forces laid siege to the Carthaginian cities of Hippo and Utica. As a result, Hanno and Hamilcar Barca,

laying aside their personal and political differences, laboured to bring the revolt under control and were assisted by the defection to the Carthaginian side of a Numidian chief Naravas who brought with him essential cavalry forces, but the cities of Hippo and Utica joined the revolt and massacred the Carthaginian garrisons in 237 B.C. By 239 B.C. after a war of appalling atrocities on both sides, the revolt had been completely crushed.

Though successful in restoring their control in north-west Africa, the Carthaginians suffered a further territorial loss outside Africa, and under the terms of peace of 241 B.C. Carthage had retained possession of the island of Sardinia, but during the revolt in Africa which followed the peace, the mercenary forces forming the Carthaginian garrison in Sardinia also mutinied and the Carthaginians lost control of the

· island. When it became clear that the revolt in Africa had failed, the rebels in Sardinia appealed for protection to Rome, and the Romans immediately sent forces to annex the island in 238 B.C. and the Carthaginian protests were met with a threat of war unless Carthage renounced her claim to Sardinia and paid an additional indemnity of 1,200 talents. These terms she was forced to accept being in no condition to renew the war. In the meantime, Corsica was lost as well. By this patent injustice, which brought her little real advantage, Rome lost her reputation for fairness towards former enemies and earned undying hatred at Carthage where Hamilcar's war party was confirmed in power.

the expansion of Carthage and the
appearance of Hannibal the great

The recent complications of foreign and internal strife had indeed so weakened the Punic power that the prospect of renewing the war under favourable circumstances seemed remote enough. Yet the scheme of preparing for a fresh conflict found a worthy champion in Hamilcar Barca who sought to compensate for the loss of Sicily by acquiring a dominion in Spain where Carthage might gain new wealth and form a fresh base of operations against Rome . Hamilcar Barca was sent to Spain by marching west along the north shore of Africa and crossing the straits at Gibralter with the few ships available as ferries, and in 236 B.C. Hamilcar reached Gades. For some eight years Hamilcar fought his way

· tirelessly east then north as far as Alicante which he
founded as Acra Leuce and intimidated by his
brilliance an increasing number of native chiefs joined
him as the campaigns proceeded but he was killed in
228 B.C. Hamilcar was succeeded by his Lieutenant
Hasdrubal Pulcher who married a Spanish girl, thus
cementing the bonds of loyalty of many Spanish tribes
· and he raised new Carthage (Cartagena) as the capital
of the dominion at the best harbour on the east coast.
· From here and with customary industry, the
Carthaginians exploited the resources of the territory.
By 226 B.C. positive misgivings had been stirred by
Hasdrubal's expansion toward northern Gaul which
was hostile to Rome, and a treaty was negotiated by
which the Carthaginians agreed to confine their forces
south of the river Ebro .

In 221 B.C. Hannibal took over the command after Hasdrubal's death (Hannibal was a Carthaginian general he was born in 247 B.C. and at the age of nine he was taken by his father to Spain after swearing eternal hatred against the Romans). Hannibal was the oldest of Hamilcar's four sons, and he was only twenty-five years old, yet Hannibal was the choice of the army in the peninsula and of the popular assembly at Carthage. A few months after Hannibal assumed command on the army and province of Spain, he conducted a campaign against the Ilercades, and in 220 B.C. he moved against the vaccaei and overcame the Carpetani in a battle near Tagus.

In 219 B.C. Hannibal laid siege to Saguntum, the only city in eastern Spain south of the Ebro which still resisted his armies.

Saguntum had formed an alliance with Rome about the time of the Ebro agreement and she now appealed to Rome for assistance. Rome protested to Hannibal and then direct to Carthage but without avail. Eight months later Hannibal took Saguntum, but Rome demanded the surrender of Hannibal; the demand was refused and war was declared by Rome in March 218 B.C. and this was the beginning of second Punic war .

Chapter three

The Second Punic War

The seeds of the new war had been sown at the end of the first Punic War, but more especially at the seizure by Rome of Sardinia.

(1)

The great war between Hannibal and Rome

In 226 B.C. when the Romans viewed the recovery of Carthaginian power with apprehension, they sought and obtained from Hasdrubal an undertaking that Carthaginian forces would not operate beyond the river Ebro in northern Spain; but the Romans violated the agreement by forming an alliance with the town of Saguntum to the south of the Ebro.

When Hannibal felt that he was ready, he provoked a Roman declaration of war by attacking and

destroying Saguntum in 218 B.C. He did this because he thought it necessary in order to uphold the position of Carthage as a great power; at the same time he thought that he could win victory which he hoped to achieve by the hammer-blows of his army . In fact, the moment that Hannibal selected was a good one. The Romans had during recent years discomfited the Boii and crossing the Po vally had subjugated the Insubres(Po is a river of northern Italy and the dominating factor in its geography ; it is the longest river in Italy about 310 miles direct , and 417 miles including its many windings , and the area of its basin which includes portions of Switzerland is estimated at 26,798 sq, miles) . the power of the Gauls was not yet broken and hatred of the victors was still extreme .The Romans had scarcely begun to establish themselves in the conquered territory. Therefore, at

that juncture the valley of the Po offered Hannibal an excellent base for a war against Rome.

Hannibal's strategy was a direct attack on Rome's position inside Italy, and there was no attempt to revive Carthaginian naval power and recover the command of the sea lost to Rome in the previous war. leaving Spain under the command of his brother Hasdrubal, Hannibal marched towards the Ebro in the spring of 218 B.C., he crossed the river by the end of May 218 B.C. and then spent two months in operations against the tribes between the Ebro and the Pyrenees(Pyrenees was a range of mountains in south west Europe separating the Iberian peninsula from France and extending for about 240 miles from the Bay of Biscay to Cape Creus). This slow progress was intentional; he was anxious that his opponents should not have the slightest suspicion of his contemplated

invasion of the Po valley. the Romans unsuspecting did not make any preparations in upper Italy for the defence of the passes of the western Alps. They thought that they could always halt any possible advance near the Rhone with the strong allied city of Marseilles as their base. This had been a major element in the plans of the Roman consul Scipio, and he therefore transported his army of two legions by sea from Pisa to the mouth of the Rhone .

however, Scipio learned later that Hannibal was already north of him, near the right bank of the river, he moved northward along the right bank of the Rhone with his legions. but again he found that Hannibal had crossed the river and was proceeding northward on the left bank with intentions that were not clear to him. Scipio then returned to the sea, embarked his legions for Spain with the intention of

campaigning against the Carthaginian forces that still remained there, and accordingly entrusted the command to his brother Gneaus. he himself sailed from Marseilles for Pisa to take command of the two legions stationed there to guard the territory and protect the two recently – founded Roman colonies near the river Placentia and Cremona. In the meantime Hannibal returned southward and crossed the pass of Mont Genevre to Italy and to the valley of Susa. He quickly overwhelmed the stronghold of the hostile Taurinia Gauls then he gathered friendly tribes to his support and moved down the Po toward the newly-formed Roman colonies of Placentia and Cremona. Scipio meanwhile had advanced to a northern tributary" the Ticino". A cavalry skirmish demonstrated the superiority of the Numidians over the Roman horse and led to the injury of Scipio who

withdrew south of the Po to the Trebia where Sempronius Longus, the Roman consul recalled from the African expedition, soon joined him with two further legions. Sempronius resolved to force a battle before winter and crossed the river Trebia. On the far side Hannibal had posted a concealed detachment under Mago (his brother) and when the consul joined battle with the main Carthaginian force, Mago took his men in the flank and rear to complete their confusion for their retreat was cut off by the river. Only a few of the Roman legionaries escaped and some 25,000 to 26,000 Romans were lost. Sempronius, however, pleaded storm and flood to excuse his defeat and tried to belittle the fact that he had been outmanoeuvred at every stage on ground picked by Hannibal precisely for its natural snares.

Trebia finally closed a momentous year with Carthaginian commanding most of the territory north of the Appenines through which he could choose his passage the next spring . Moreover, the campaign had won to his side not only a host of anti-Roman Celts but a number who had formely served Rome . Most important this campaign had fulfilled the strategic purpose of averting an offensive against Carthage by concentrating Roman forced in the north.

(2)

More Victories for Hannibal

In 217 B.C. the Romans stood on the defensive in the peninsula with one army commanded by Gaius Flaminius at Arretium(an ancient city of Etruria on the upper valley of Arno on the via Cassia, about 50

miles S.E. of Florentia ; it was an important Roman base during the Hannibalic wars) and the other under Gnaeus Servilius at Ariminum(a city of Aemilia north East of Italy , it was founded by Umbrians in 268 B.C.,and became a Roman colony). Eluding the vigilance of Flaminius, Hannibal succeeded in crossing the Apennines and proceeded to ravage north-eastern Etruria and then he moved unexpected by from Cortona along the northern shore of Lake Trasimene in the direction of Perugia as if he intended to attack the other consul Servilius who was coming down by forced marches from Ariminum to effect a junction with his colleague in Etruria. Flaminius later decided to press forward, and when he reached the north shore of lake Trasimene and was marching through the narrow Borghetto pass, Hannibal's army attacked him from all sides, blocking the pass and swarming

down the valley slopes. Hannibal had set a trap for him and the Romans had marched straight into it. They had no chance and Flaminius was killed and his army massacred. In the meantime, Servilius was unable to get his main force near enough to help Flaminius, and when he sent 4.000 troops, they were intercepted by Hannibal's cavalry leader Maharbal who wiped them out . News of these defeats produced consternation at Rome and the senator Fabius Maximus was appointed director in the crisis to strengthen the defences of the city. Hannibal, however, avoided Rome, and he turned east into Picenum where his troops rested. From Picenum; Hannibal marched into Apulia and crossed into Campania where he laid waste the fertile Ager Falernus, and with his amazing skill in maneuver and exhibiting admirable judgment he evaded the

ambushes for him with considerably superior forces by the dictator and returned to the northern Apulia to take up his winter quarters in 217 – 216 B.C. By May 216 B.C. Hannibal suddenly moved further south near the Aufidus and there he seized the fortress of Cannae where the Roman had a large supply depot. By this Hannibal secured stores for his army and at the same time had the advantage of moving into an undevastated area well suited to his skillful manoeuvring. Here, near the Aufidus, he was overtaken by the consuls for the year 216 B.C., Lucius Aemilius Paulus and Gaius Terentius Varro with one of the largest armies that Rome had ever put in the field, about 50,000 strong (allowing for the exaggerations of tradition which sets it at 30,000). Their intention was to engage the enemy in a decisive battle. The Romans had two camps, one on either

bank of the river connected by a bridge; in the meantime Hannibal had a camp on the right bank further downstream.

The Romans drew up in order of battle on the left bank of the Aufidus with their front facing the sea and their right resting on the river; they thought that if they were defeated they could fall back either on the left bank towards Asculum or Aquilonia or by crossing the bridge between the two camps on the right bank towards Canusium or Venusia . on the other hand if Hannibal gave battle on the Apulian, he had to be prepared to fight with his back to the sea and risk a complete disaster if defeated, since he had on line of retreat.

Indeed, Hannibal relied on the efficacy of a manoeuvre that made the battle of Cannae famous

and had been successfully imitated several times in modern warfare .

Hannibal's tactics were based on the expectation that the dense legions at the centre of the Roman formation would drive his middle part of the infantry line (consisted of the Gauls and Spaniards) back through the Libyan lines which would then turn inwards on the legions from either flank then the crescent would no longer be convex but concave, a pincer with the Roman legions in its jaws.

however, success depended on Hannibal's horsemen taking out the Roman wings and crucially on the Gauls and Spaniards who would give ground without breaking. The manoeuvre worked perfectly and as a final stroke, the Spanish cavalry, leaving the Libyans to complete the rout of the Roman wings, engaged the rear of the legions to complete their encirclement.

Finally, Aemilius Paulus and 80 senators fell with 25,000 or more legionaries in the deadly ring. another 10,000 Romans of their side were killed or captured later .

Indeed, Cannea represented Rome's darkest hour in the Punci wars. However,, by these defeats inflicted on the Romans, the south Italian nations at last found the courage to secede from Rome and the leaders of the movement were the people of Caqua, the second greatest town of Italy . In the meantime, reinforcements were sent from Carthage and several neutral powers prepared to throw their weight into the scale on Hannibal's behalf.

Roman Reaction

At first sight it seems strange that the battle of Cannae did not decide the war, but the resources of Rome (though terribly reduced in respect both of men and of money) were not yet exhausted. In north and central Italy the insurrection spread but little and could be sufficiently guarded against with small detachments. In the south, the Greek towns of the coast remained loyal and the numerous Latin colonies continued to render important service by interrupting free communication between the rebels and detaining part of their forces.

In Rome itself the quarrels between the nobles and commons gave way to a unanimity unparalleled in the annals of the Republic and the guidance of operations was henceforth left to the senate which by maintaining

a persistent policy until the conflict was brought to a successful end earned its greatest title to fame. The subsequent campaigns of the Italian war assume a new character though the Romans contrived at times to raise 200,000 men; their generals among who the veterans Fabius and M. Claudius Marcellus frequently held the most important commands, rarely ventured to engage Hannibal in the open, and contented themselves with observing him or skirmishing his detachments.

The Roman now adopted the strategy suggested by Fabius which earned him the name of Cunctator (the Delayer). His policy was never to accept battle when the enemy offered it, never to offer it on equal terms, never to attack him in his camp.

Hannibal whose recent accessions of strength were largely discounted by the necessity of assigning troops

to protect his new allies or secure their wavering loyalty, was still too weak to undertake a vigorous offensive . In 216 B.C. and 215 B.C. the chief seat of war was Campania where Hannibal vainly attempted to establish himself on the coast but experienced a severe repulse at Nola .

In 214, B.C. the main Carthaginian force was transferred to Apulia(a part of Italy once inhabited by the Apuli round Mt.Garganus on the east coast (in hopes of capturing Tarentum. Though Croton and Locri on the Calabrian coast had fallen into his hands but Hannibal still lacked a suitable harbour by which he might have secured his oversea communication. For two years he watched in vain for an opportunity of surprising the town while the Romans narrowed down the sphere of revolt in Campania(a territorial division of Italy) and defeated other Carthaginian

commanders. In 212 B.C. the greater part of Tarentum and other cities of the southern seaboard at last came into Hannibales power, but in the same year the Romans found themselves strong enough to place Capua under blockade; and in 211 B.C. Hannibal made a last effort to relieve his allies by a feint upon Rome itself but the besiegers refused to be drawn from their entrenchments and eventually Capua was starved into surrender.

In 209 B.C. the Romans gained a further important success by recovering Tarentum; though Hannibal still won isolated engagements, he was being slowly driven back into the extreme south of the peninsula. But in 207 B.C. the arrival of a fresh invading force produced a new crisis. Hasdrubal (Hannibal's brother) who in 208 B.C. had marched overland from Spain, appeared in north Italy with a force scarcely

inferior to the army which his brother had brought in 218 B.C. After levying contingents of Gauls and Ligurians he marched down the east coast with the object of joining hands with his brother in central Italy for a direct attack upon Rome. By a supreme effort the Romans raised their war establishment to the highest total yet attained and sent a strong field army against either Carthaginian leader, but the danger to Rome was chiefly averted by the prompt insight and enterprise of the consul C. Nero who commanded the main army in the south.

Having been convinced that Hannibal would not advance beyond Apulia until his brother had established communications with him, Nero slipped through with part of his troops and arrived in time to reinforce his colleague Livius whose force had recently got into touch with Hasdrubal near Sena

Gallica. The combined Roman army frustrated an attempt by Hasdrubal to elude it and forced him to fight on the banks of the Metaurus; the battle at first was evenly contested until Nero cut off the Carthaginian retreat and finally Hasdrubal himself fell and the bulk of his army was destroyed.

The defeat of Hasdrubal at the Metaurus deprived Hannibal of his last hope of making a recovery in Italy and the fatal news was conveyed to him by the severed head of his brother being cast by the Romans into his camp, as a result, Hannibal abandoned all idea of an offensive and retired into Brutium where he concentrated the forces of those allies who had remained loyal to him. Here, for four more years he withstood the Romans, fiercely contesting every step of their advance, and making them pay heavily for such successes as they gained by their strategy of

attrition. Finally, Hannibal in accordance with orders from home sailed back to Africa and another expedition under his brother Mago was driven back on the coast and withdrawn at about the same time (203 B.C.).

(4)

The battle of Sicily

In Sicily more serious conflict broke out; at first so the isolated attacks by the Carthaginian squadrons were frustrated by the strong Roman fleet, but in 215 B.C. internal complications arose.

The death of Hiero 2nd (Rome's steadfast friend) left the kingdom of Syracuse to his grandson Hieronymus. Flattered by the promises of the Carthaginians, the young prince broke with the Romans, but before hostilities commenced he was assassinated. As a result, the Syracusan people repudiated the monarchy and resumed their republican constitution but they were misled by false threats of terrible punishment at the hands of Rome to play into the hands of the Carthaginians.

The attacks of a Roman army and fleet under Marcellus which speedily appeared before the town were completely baffled by the mechanical contrivances of the Syracusan mathematician Archimedes in 213 B.C. In the meantime, the revolt against Rome spread in the interior and the Carthaginian fleet established itself in the towns of the south coast.

In 212 B.C. Marcellus at last broke through the defence of Syracuse and in spite of the arrival of a Carthaginian relief force mastered the town by slow degrees. However, guerilla warfare continued in which the Carthaginians maintained the upper hand until in 210 B.C. they lost their base at Agrigentum. They were also dislodged from their remaining positions and by the end of the year Sicily was under the power of Rome. The island was pillaged, its art

treasures carried off to Rome and Archimedes was killed. But in 210 B.C. Agrigentum was surrendered by a Libyan renegade and peace was soon restored in Sicily.

(5)

The Roman Carthaginian war in Spain

The conflict in Spain was second in importance to the Italian war alone. From Spain, the Carthaginians drew large supplies of troops and money which served to reinforce the Carthaginian army. The Romans decided to challenge the Carthaginians within their Spanish domain by sending the generals Publius and Gnaeus Scipio who won over the peoples north of the Ebro and defeated the Carthaginian leader Hasdrubal Barca in his attempts to restore communication with Italy. They also carried their arms along the east coast

into the heart of the Carthaginian's domain but they were cut off by the Carthaginian cavalry, among which the Numidian prince Massinissa rendered conspicuous service, the Roman generals were slain and their troops were destroyed in 211 B.C. But disturbances in Africa prevented the Punic commanders from reaping the full fruit of their success and before long the fall of Capua inabled Rome to transfer troops from Italy to Spain, and in 209 B.C. the Roman General P. Cornelius Scipio (a son of the P. Scipio who was lately killed in action) was placed in command.

In the year of his arrival (209 B.C.) all Spain south of the Ebro was under Carthaginian control but fortunately for him the three Carthaginian generals" Hasdrubal, Mago (Hannibal's brothers) and Hasdrubal the son of Gisco" were not-disposed to act

in concert and were pre-occupied with revolts in Africa. On landing at the mouth of Ebro, Scipio was enabled to surprise and capture Carthagera (the headquarters of the Carthaginian power in Spain). He thus obtained a rich booty of war stores and supplies, and an excellent harbour.

in 209 B.C. Scipio drove back Hasdrubal from his position at Baecula (on the upper Guadalquivir) but was unable to hinder his march to Italy. After winning over a number of Spanish chiefs he achieved in 206 B.C. a decisive victory at Ilipa (near Corduba) which resulted in the evacuation of Spain by the Punic commanders; in the same year Scipio received the surrender of Gades (the Carthaginian Dunkirk).

(6)

The second invasion of Africa

During the second war with Rome, as in the first, the Carthaginian war effort was hampered by difficulties inside Africa. In 215 B.C. war broke out with Syphax (the powerful ruler of the Masaesylii), a western Numidian tribe, and the Roman commanders in Spain sent military advisers to assist Syphax, but at the same time the Carthaginians had to recall Hasdrubal from Spain to undertake the command against him; although the Carthaginians were assisted by the Massylii (a rival Numidian tribe) they were unable to inflict a decisive defeat upon Syphax, and finally a peace negotiated in 212 B.C left him in possession of his territory. Subsequently Syphax intrigued with both Rome and Carthage but was eventually won over to a firm alliance with Carthage.

The Romans decided to strike a blow at Carthage in Africa. Scipio paid a visit to the Numidian rulers (Syphax and Massinissa) but at the court of Syphax he was foiled by the presence of Hasdrubal (the son of Gisgo) whose daughter Sophonisba was married to the Numidian chief. On his return to Spain, Scipio had to quell a mutiny among his troops; in the meantime, Hannibal's brother Mago had sailed for Italy, and in 206 B.C. Scipio himself (having secured the Roman occupation of Spain by the capture of Gades) gave up his command and returned to Rome.

In 205 B.C. Scipio proposed to the Roman senate an attack upon the home territory of Carthage. The senate at first refused (they were unwilling to undertake new commitments while Hannibal was still in Italy), but by winning popular support for his plans he forced the hand of the senate and was elected

consul with the command of Sicily. In 204 B.C. Scipio sailed across to Africa; he was met by a combined levy of Carthage and king Syphax of Numidia who brought forces to the assistance of Carthage.

Previously mentioned Carthage had secured the friendship of the Numidian Syphax whose advance compelled Scipio to raise the siege of Utica and to entrench himself on the shore between that place and Carthage; in the meantime, Scipio secured the alliance of Masinissa (the rival ruler of the Massylios).

In 203 B.C. Scipio was able to destroy the two combined armies of the Carthaginians and Numidians, and Syphax was captured. These disasters induced the Carthaginians to sue for peace but a sudden reversal of opinion caused them to recall Hannibal and his brother Mago who had been engaged in a fruitless attempt to bring another rising

in the north among the Gauls and Ligurians. Mago embarked for Africa but died of wounds during the voyage, and Hannibal finally abandoned Italy in the autumn of 203 B.C. in order to go to the help of his country.

(7)

Hannibal and Scipio

Hannibal landed with his army at Leptis Minor and encamped near Hadrumetum (a town of ancient Africa on the southern extremity of the Sinus Neapolitanus on the east coast of Tunisia). The large forces collected at Hadrumetum and the presence of their greatest general now induced the Carthaginians to try once more the test of arms.

Scipio now recalled his ally Masinissa (King of the Massilian Numidians) who had been sent into Numidia to fight against Vermina (son of Syphax)

king of the Massaeylians and allied like his father to the Carthaginians.

In 202 B.C. Scipio decided to climb the Bagra in order to make a junction with the Numidians; Hannibal sent for Vermina and moved from Hadrumetum into the interior to join him and encamped not far from Scipio (near Zama Regia). Scipio instead of retiring towards his base, boldly moved forward towards Naraggara (between the Bagra and the Muchtul) where he effected a satisfactory junction with the Numidian cavalry that Masinissa was bringing him.

Finally Hannibal met Scipio but after an abortive conference with Scipio, he prepared for a decisive battle at Zama (an inland site not yet identified with certainty). Scipio's force were well trained throughout and were greatly superior in cavalry.

the battle was ultimately decided by the cavalry of the Romans and their new ally Massinissa which by a manoeuvre recalling the tactics of Cannae took Hannibal's line in the rear and defeated them. The Carthaginians having lost their last army applied for peace and accepted the terms which Scipio offered. The terms were as follows:

- The Carthaginians were compelled to cede Spain and the Mediterranean islands still in their hands.
- to surrender their warships.
- to pay an indemnity of 10,000 talents.
- and to forfeit their independence in affairs of war and foreign policy.

After the conclusion of peace, Carthage despite her defeat displayed the greatest confidence in Hannibal and placed him at the head of the government to reorganize the public affairs.

Indeed, Hannibal proved as great in administration as in war, and soon he restored the state finances, and in a short time the Carthaginians were able to make Rome an offer of payment in full of the heavy war indemnity that had been exacted; but Rome did not want Carthage to recover.

A few years later, Roman envoys came to Carthage to accuse Hannibal of conspiring against the peace, and he was forced to escape secretly, and took refuge in 195 B.C. with Antiochus 3rd the Great (King of Syria) who having reunited the old Seleucid(Seleucid dynasty was a line of kings who reigned in Near Asia from 321 to 65 B.C.). Empire Seleucid was in diplomatic conflict with Rome since the latter after her victory in the Second Macedonian war had established herself in the hegemony of the Balkan peninsula. The diplomatic conflict between Syria and

Rome dragged on for some years until in 192 B.C. response to an appeal from the Aetolians(a district of northern Greece) who had taken up arms against Rome; Antiochus landed in Aetolia and began the so-called Syrian war. He had been incited to this war by the great Carthaginian refugee who hoped that it might lead to the liberation of his country.

In 191 B.C. the naval battle of the Corycus gave the Romans the command of the Aegaeon. It was essential for Antiochus to regain it, and with this object, while his admiral Polyxenides was operating in the Aegaeon, Hannibal was sent to Phoenicia to collect a fleet with which to help the principal Syrian squadron.

In 190 B.C. Hannibal moved north from Phoenicia with 37 warships but near the promontory of Side he encountered the fleet of the Rhodians (allies of Rome) who disputed his passage and after a fierce fight

Hannibal was defeated and forced to retire; Hannibal then decided to join Polyxenides in the decisive struggle; but by land and sea the fortune of war was against the Syrians and after the defeat of Polyxendes at Myonessus and at Magnesia, the king was obliged to accept the peace terms imposed by the Romans which included the surrender of Hannibal.

Hannibal effected his escape and he later appeared at the court of Prusias (King of Bithynia) who was not dependent on Rome (Bithynia a district in the north-west of Asia Minor, on the east it adjoined Paphlagonia, on the west and south-west Mysia, and on the south Phrygia and Galatia). It was Hannibal who suggested to his protector a magnificent site which was chosen for the foundation of the city of Prusa; later Hannibal took part in the war between Prusias and Eumenes 2nd (King of Pergamus) in which

he gained his last success "the naval victory of the Bithynian fleet over that of Pergamus". The war ended when Rome imposed her mediation on the contending parties, these events drew the attention of the Romans upon Hannibal and through Titus Quintius Flamininus the Romans demanded that Prusias should be surrounded by soldiers in order to get Hannibal's head. But Hannibal committed suicide by taking poison in 183 B.C.

(8)

The death of Hannibal.

the greatest warriors of all time

Indeed , Hannibal was certainly one of the greatest Carthaginian personalities, but unfortunately we know little about him, and the tradition that has come

down to us is often vitiated by the partisan hatred felt by his adversaries.

In fact, all the ancient writers without exception pay homage to his incomparable military genius and all but a few modern writers regard him as one of the greatest warriors of all time.

The Roman history charges him with acts of cruelty but those cruel acts of which there is reliable evidence do not exceed what the customary laws of war in ancient times were cruel enough to permit.

Indeed, the terrible tragedy of Carthage's struggle for existence affords them an extenuation which is not forthcoming for some of the atrocities committed by the Roman commanders in the second century. In fact, on more than one occasion Hannibal displayed generosity towards a fallen enemy, and the Punic faith of which the Roman sources always accused Hannibal

seemed to have no more foundation than resides in the military stratagems of which he made free use, and these were certainly far more innocent than the somewhat dishonourable stratagems employed by Scipio Africanus to surprise the camps of Hasdrubal and Syphax.

Hannibal was a cultured man, acquainted with several languages.

He spoke and wrote Greek, Roman and Phoenician as well as some other languages; he was a rough, frank, soldierly spirit.

In fact, little or nothing is known of his private life; it is believed that he was married to a Spanish woman from Castulo by whom he does not seem to have had any children. Moreover, the ancient writers who managed to find more or less well-authenticated scandalous anecdotes about almost all the greatest

·
· men of antiquity laud his morality to the skies, and
much as they may hate him, they can find no least
speak on his fair fame in this regard.

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Chapter Four
The third Punic war

The peace of 202 B.C. left Carthage with insignificant political power but its commerce and material resources revived in the 2nd century B.C.

Indeed, despite the loss of all its overseas dependencies, Carthage still controlled an extensive territory of good agricultural land in the interior of north Africa which yielded a substantial surplus of corn for export. Moreover, the enforced reduction of military expenditure under the terms of the treaty with Rome had also facilitated the process of economic recovery. It was reported that, on several occasions the Carthaginians supplied large quantities of their agricultural goods for the provision of Roman armies, but the Roman suspicions and fears of Carthage were not assuaged; therefore, the Romans encouraged their ally Masinissa (the ruler of Numidia) to encroach upon Carthaginian territory in the interior of Africa.

(1)

**Cato press for the destruction
of Carthage**

The vague terms of the treaty of 201 B.C. forbade Carthage to go to war outside Africa at all or to go to war within Africa without Roman approval. In the meantime, the Romans allowed Masinissa to have any territory which at any time had been held by himself or his ancestors, and the failure to define these excepted areas more accurately resulted in Masinissa repeatedly encroaching upon Carthaginian possessions.

Time and again Roman arbitrators either favoured Massinissa or did nothing which in practice left the king of Numidia in possession.

In 161 B.C. Massinissa is recorded to have seized control of the Emporia (the coastal area of Tripolitania in the east); moreover a further example

occurred around 158-156 B.C.; added to this the two Carthaginian provinces of the Great Plains around Vaga and Tusca in the west in about 153 B.C.

Inevitably feelings of impatience, resentment, anger, and distrust spread and deepened among the Carthaginians which weakening the pro-Roman and pro-Numidian factions and strengthening the more militant democrats. These feelings found expression in raids on Massinissa's settlers in disputed areas and inciting rural Africans against the King of Numidia. The consequent fighting (mainly of raids and counter raids) was ended by Roman ambassadors who left Massinissa once more in control of the disputed territory. But soon Massinissa raised a new dispute and again Carthage appealed to Rome, and again in 152 B.C. an embassy was sent out to Carthage. The ambassadors among whom was Cato (Marcus Porcius

Cato 234-149 B.C.) ; they offered to arbitrate while Massinissa staged a withdrawal from some of the disputed territory (doubtless confident that Roman arbitration would favour him at least in part). But the patience of the Carthaginians had been strained too far; their distrust had grown too great, and they refused to submit to arbitration; As a result, Cato and his companions returned to Rome with the quarrel undecided; there, Cato began to press for war and the destruction of Carthage.

In 151 B.C. when Numidia complained to Rome and reported that Carthage was rearming, the Romans sent a new embassy of investigation to Carthage; in the meantime, Cato once more demanded the immediate war against Carthage but the more moderate consuls reduced this to a threat of war unless Carthage disarmed. The Carthaginians,

however, decided to expel the pro-Numidin faction from Carthage, at the same time they attacked the retinue of Massinissa's son Gulussa and when Massinissa retaliated they sent out a large army which took the decisive step of pursuing him beyond the recognized frontier in 150 B.C. but the Romans joined Massinissa against them and the long and fierce struggle went in favour of the Romans and Numidians, this was followed by an attempt to negotiate a settlement. At the conference which was arranged by Scipio Aemilianus, the Carthaginians offered large concessions but absolutely refused to hand over Numidian deserters whom had joined them. However, in renewed hostilities the Punic troops were encircled and eventually compelled to surrender and most of them to be treacherously massacred by Massinissa's son. The Romans immediately sent their

army to Africa and although the Carthaginians consented to make reparation by giving hostages and surrendering their arms, there was a demand by the Romans for them to immigrate to some inland site where they would be debarred from commerce; but the Carthaginians refused it.

(2)

Rome declares war against Carthage

The agitation for the destruction of Carthage which had been inspired and directed by Cato was now supported by the majority of the Roman senators. Indeed, there laid behind the agitation irrational forces of prejudice and hatred as well as a demand for harsher methods of maintaining Roman power and influence. But the main motive was actually fear; fear of a Carthage economically resurgent and rearming.

feat of a people who had shown themselves restive and impatient, and liable to support leaders who advocated a policy of military self-assertion and who sought to crush Numidia. Also fear of a city which had every reason to hate Rome.

The Romans decided to end that fear once and for all, and at the same time to act in belief that the fear could never be ended so long as the Carthaginians occupied a site so politically and strategically advantageous. After the refusal of a demand that Carthage should be evacuated and its people settled elsewhere, Rome declared war against Carthage in 149 B.C.

As soon as Roman declared war several Phoenician cities including Utica, Hadrumetum and Leptis Minor went over to the Romans who also received assistance from Massinissa's successors in Numidia; but on the other side the Carthaginians appeared to have

retained the loyalty of most of their Libyan subjects and were also aided by some of the Mauri who lived to the west of Numidia.

The Roman military expedition against Carthage was something not to be missed, either by aristocratic officers with an eye to prestige and reputation or by the rank and file whom expected quick success and doubtless plentiful booty. The Roman consuls M. Manilius and L. Marcius Censorinus who commanded the fleet did not achieve the rapid success anticipated; their initial assaults were not only repulsed but were met with energetic and by no means profitless counter-attacks, and endeavours to establish a regular siege suffered various set-backs. After the departure of Censorinus, Manilius made only limited progress in reducing other Punic strongholds while the first of his two vain attempts to bring to battle Hasdrubal's field

army led to a serious reverse which might easily have become a major disaster. Finally, his place was taken by one of the new consuls L. Calpurnius Piso Caesoninus.

The war against Carthage dragged on through 148 B.C. with little sign of progress; Piso, not attempting to assault Carthage itself or to join battle with Hasdrubal, turned to the reasonable but unspectacular task of reducing other cities which still adhered to Carthage, but in this he met with only limited success and suffered some reverses, while on the other hand the Carthaginians were re-asserting themselves and even won over a Numidian chieftain with 800 cavalry.

At this stage, Scipio Aemilianus appears to have saved the Roman campaign by rescuing Manilius and his army from disaster on the futile Neperis enterprise

and by saving four cohorts from massacre on the withdrawal; he also persuaded Hasdrubal to give decent burial to the Roman dead. When Scipio arrived at Cirta, he found Massinissa dead, and he immediately appointed the oldest of Massinissa's three legitimate sons "Micipas" to take charge of the palace and Cirta, the youngest "Mastanubal" was assigned the post of justice and the middle son "Gulussa" a warlike man was given charge of foreign policy. With Gulussa's goodwill, Scipio indeed a political trump in what emerged as a bid for control of the whole campaign. It was clear that in several ways the Carthaginians were encouraged in their brave defence; with Scipio elsewhere the sons of Massinissa showed little eagerness to help the invaders, added to this, some Numidian cavalry joined the Carthaginians; and while Hasdrubal contrived to get

supplies to the city, messengers slipped out to establish ties with distant allies such as the Moors beyond Numidia, and the Macedonia pretender Andriscus, then in arms against the Romans. The diplomatic initiatives brought little practical assistance but helped to keep up morale. On the other hand, spirits in the Roman camp were at low ebb; the men had come for easy victory and stayed to get their heads drubbed; in the meantime, the consuls Calpurnius Piso and his legate Mancinus appeared to have shrunk from asking much of their unhappy troops. The commanders refrained from directing fresh attacks against the city by marching instead on such lesser places still loyal to Carthage as Clupea and Neapolis. At the base of the Cap Bon peninsula Neapolis surrendered but Hippo Acra defended herself so fiercely that the Roman besiegers withdrew empty-

handed. Finally, dissatisfaction in Rome made way for Scipio to take as long as necessary to raze Carthage, and after taking strong action to restore the discipline of the army, Scipio set about operations in earnest. However, while Scipio revitalized his army, the Carthaginians took steps to meet a heightened offensive; of these, the most important was the transfer of Hasdrubal from Nepheris to assume command of the city's defence and the Nepheris command now passed to a captain named Diogenes (a Greek mercenary).

In a swift attack by Scipio on two portions of the wall beside the northern gulf, he succeeded in entering the rural quarter of the Megara with 4,000 troops but he was forced to withdraw without luck. As a result Scipio decided to complete the blockade of the city in order to weaken the defenders by famine, and he

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· spent several weeks building elaborate fortifications right across the isthmus which linked the city with the mainland. These works described by Polybius(Polybius 201-120 B.C., Greek historian was born at Megalopolis in Arcadis) were as follows: two parallel trenches were dug from shore across the isthmus and joined near the water on either side by two more, completing a quadrilateral; then the mounds from the trenches were palisaded (on the section facing Carthage), to a height of twelve feet, on the same side was built a series of observation towers, the central of which had a wooden superstructure of four storeys. This offered a clear view of the Megara; the result was a fortified enclave blocking Carthage from the mainland and defensible by a fraction of Scipio's total force; moreover, combined with a sea blockade by the Roman fleet, the blockade on the city

was grimly claustrophobic; and the siege in earnest. Hasdrubal had decided to pull into the Byrsa to shorten his defensive line. Having garrisoned the fort on the isthmus, Scipio marched the great part of his army southeast round the city toward the taenia where he based his fleet; here, he was close to the shallows of the bay of Kram.

The measure of Scipio's reluctance to take on the Carthaginians, even with his immense force was demonstrated by the second of his engineering prodigies; he built the great mole from the taenia across the bay of kram to the choma (outer quay) shutting off the common entrance to the harbours. Scipio's mole was described by Appian(Appian of Alexandria , Roman historian) as 24 feet wide at the top and 96 feet across the base; at that rate (according to one modern estimate) more than 12,000 cubic

metres of stone would have had to be shifted in the construction; in the meantime, the Carthaginians began the improvisation of a fighting fleet from old materials, added to this, the digging of a new harbour entrance (a direct channel from the naval basin to emerge at sea north of the outer quay). The building of the fleet was no less secretive, and in this, the seclusion of the naval base greatly helped, and fifty vessels were constructed.

Indeed, the Carthaginians had neither time nor the supplies to build heavyweight warships, but the relatively light, highly manoeuvrable craft were their preference; here Polybius(Greek historian) wrote: "their ships were built to move in all directions with great agility, their oarsmen were experts, If some of their vessels were hard-pressed by the enemy, their light weight enabled them to withdraw safely and

make for open water.....should the enemy attempt pursuit, they came quickly about, darting round them, attacking on the beam, always harassing . Finally, the Carthaginians dug their channel and their fleet appeared at sea; and it was a brilliant stroke, utterly surprising the Romans. The little navy bravely engaged the powerful fleet, then withdrew toward the harbour in the evening, while the smaller of the Punic galleys nosed into the channel first, their sisters lay up by outer quay to the south covered by artillery on the city walls and on the quay itself; in the meantime, the big Roman warships that had followed were baffled. On the day following the naval action, Roman troops appeared equipped with rams and assault machines; their objective was a defence post on the broad outer quay from which Carthaginian artillery had pounded their warships; in revenge, the Romans applied their

engines to the stronghold, smashing part of its guard-wall. In a classic operation against the Roman engines, a party of Carthaginian swimmers scrambled from the water slipped to the machines under cover of darkness and suddenly lit torches, and with suicidal preoccupation they pursued their task until the siege engines were blazing. Here, it was reported that Scipio had to deploy a cavalry squadron to prevent desertions among his troops but in the meantime the Carthaginians repaired the damaged strong-post.

Finally, the fight for the outer quay (choma) resumed with fresh fury, and with burning projectiles, the Romans occupied the whole outer quay; and the fall of the choma was a death-blow to the harbours. Indeed, the fall of the stronghold (cutting Carthage's last flimsy life-line) signaled the capitulation of the few other African towns yet to bow to Rome. The Roman

commander organized to joint Roman-Numidian campaign against the inland fort; although the Carthaginians made at least one final attempt to obtain tolerable terms from the Romans, but the Roman generals were notoriously envious to conclude their campaigns in time to retire as popular victors.

(3)

The complete demolition and desolation

Of the greatest Carthage

In the spring of 146 B.C. Scipio launched his final assault against the Carthaginians and a force under Laelius captured a section of the wall and established the decisive foothold within; there ensued a week of continuous and horrifying house-to-house street-fighting. Here, the Carthaginians showered projectiles on the Romans from six-story buildings; inside, the struggle continued to the roofs, and on planks across

the gaps between them . Many people were pitched to the ground or on to those fighting in the streets; in the buildings, the Romans slaughtered everyone they came across, tossing many of the disarmed to troops below who impaled them on raised pikes.

Dead and dying citizens were used to fill ditches across which advanced Scipio's transport .

Hear Appian wrote: the body of one was used to plug a hole, and at length Scipio ordered the whole region to be fired and the ruins flattened to make space for his advancing troops, and as this was done the falling buildings including the boodies of many civilians who had sought refuge on upper storeys had been burnt to death; others wounded and badly burnt were still alivedead and living were thrown together into pite, and it often happened that those not yet dead were crushed by the cavalry as it passed; everywhere

bodies festooned the tortured city. Young and old, male and female were uncovered in hollows sprawled on footways protruding amid crumbled masonry and charred beams.

Finally, a group of men approached the Romans and offered the surrender of those still in the Byrsa if their lives were spared, and 50,000 tragic people emerged, and at the last moment Hasdrubal surrendered his person and his family and Carthage was lost.

Looting was officially sanctioned, the rank-and-file were permitted to retain the lesser treasures while important items were earmarked for the Roman government; others were returned diplomatically to Sicily from which island many works of art had come to Carthage, in the meantime, what remained of Carthage was burned and the empty ruins flattened;

demolition complete, the ceremony of sowing salt in a furrow was enacted to symbolize eternal desolation.

The last verdict on Carthage was written by Appian: "Carthage had flourished for seven centuries since its foundation, had ruled vast territories, seas and money as the greatest empires but had surpassed them in daring and courage, for though disarmed and lacking ships it had withstood siege and famine for three years before meeting destruction.

Appian added that after the destruction of Carthage, Scipio turned to Polybius who was with him and took him by the hand saying: "this is a glorious moment Polybius and yet I am strangely fearful that some day the same fate will befall my own country".

The Roman occupation of Carthage

After Carthage had been captured and destroyed there was still much work for Scipio to do; first he had to co-operate with the customary commission of ten senators in planning the future of the conquered and surrendered territories and in organizing the new province of Africa, then when the commissioners had departed, Scipio had to put the settlement into effect . But although towns and villages which had been loyal to Carthage were sacked and their occupants sold into slavery, the remainder, even in Carthaginian territory, continued to govern themselves in the Punic manner even the official language was Punic. In the meantime, enterprising Italian traders came to settle in the coastal towns and at Cirta(an ancient city of Numidia"later Constantine" in Algeria).

Twenty four years later (122 B.C.), the Roman senate, on the proposal of Rubrius, decided to plant a colony on the site of Carthage. C. Gracchus and Fulvius were entrusted with the foundation of the new city (colonia Iunonia), placed under the protection of Juno Caelestis, but its prosperity was obstructed both by unpropitious omens and by the very recollection of the ancient feud.

Ultimately, M. Minucius passed a law abrogating that of 122 B.C. and suppressing the Colonia Iunonia; later on Julius Caesar, pursuing the last supporters of Pompey, encamped on the ruins of Carthage and on returning to Rome he dispatched thither the poor citizens who were demanding land from him, he sent new colonists. and, henceforward, the machinery of administration was regularly centred there. The pro-consuls of the African province had hitherto lived at

Utica but in 14 to 13 B.C. C.Sentius Saturninus transferred his headquarters to Carthage which henceforth was known as Colonia Iulia Carthage.

Chapter Five
Jugurthine War

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(1)

**Open war between Jugurtha
and Adherbal**

When Massinissa (king of Numidia) died in 148 B.C., his son Micipsa succeeded him as king of the country; he, like his father, was a loyal ally of Rome and a competent ruler .

Micipsa ruled over the whole of the coastal plain from the river Moulouya in the west to the Roman province in the east, including cities along the coast; to the east of the Roman province Lepcis Magna and the other cities of Tripolitanian coast were subject, having been conquered by Massinissa in 162 B.C. In the interior Micipsa's realm included the town of Capsa and a section of the Gactuli. Friendship between Rome and Numidia was maintained throughout the reign of Micipsa, and during the Numantine war(an ancient hill

fortress in northern Spain) he sent a Numidian contingent to help P. Scipio Aemilianus which was commanded by Micipsa's nephew Jugurtha (King of Numidia, and an illegitimate son of Mastanabal, also a grandson of Massinissa).

Jugurtha became a favourite with Scipio and the Roman nobles and later, Scipio wrote to Micipsa a strong letter of recommendation in favour of Jugurtha. In 118 B.C. Micipsa died and by his will Jugurtha was associated with Adherbal and Hiempsal (Micipsa's sons) in the government of Numidia, but the princes soon quarreled and few months later Jugurtha killed Hiempsal by treachery. This action led to open war between Jugurtha and Adherbal, the latter was defeated in the field and fled to Rome while Jugurtha claimed the entire kingdom. The Romans then intervened and the senate decided that Numidia

was to be divided, they gave the western (the richer and more populous half) to Jugurtha, while the sands and deserts of the eastern half were left to Adherbal and for a while Numidia aroused no more anxiety in Rome, but soon Jugurtha began to provoke Adherbal to a war of self-defence and he defeated him near Philippeville in 113 B.C. Adherbal there upon sought safety in the fortress of Cirta and sent an appeal for help to Rome; in response, the Romans sent an embassy which included M. Scaurus and which bade Jugurtha raise the siege.

Despite protests from Rome, Jugurtha forced the surrender of the town of Cirta and put to death not only Adherbal but also the Italian traders resident in the town had assisted in the defence in 112 B.C.

(2)

**Rome declare war
against Jugurtha**

In 111 B.C. the Roman senate were persuaded to declare war against Jugurtha, and an army was dispatched to Africa under the consul L. Calpurnius who attacked Numidia but the campaign proved difficult; eventually Bestia returned to Rome leaving Scaurus who signed a peace treaty with Jugurtha without consulting the Roman senate. Jugurtha had to go to give evidence against the peace treaty; before he went to Rome, Jugurtha arranged the assassination of his cousin Gulussa who was favoured by some in the Roman senate; this action, swing the balance of opinion in the senate decisively in favour of those who wanted war and Jugurtha was ordered to leave Rome.

In 110 B.C. the Roman consul P. Albinus took command of the army in Africa (the Romans feared that Jugurtha might raise Numidia to such strength that he would seriously threaten Rome); Albinus's hope of reaching a speedy decision in the field was soon disappointed; Albinus returned to Rome after the entrusted his army to his brother Aulus, but after several clashes with Jugurtha in 110 – 109 B.C. Aulus was drawn with is whole force into an ambush and finally he was forced to make peace with Jugurtha. Under the terms of this treaty Aulus's soldiers saved their lives by passing under the yoke, and Aulus undertook to evacuate Numidia; but once more the Roman senate disapproved the treaty on the ground that it had been made without authority from the senate and people. In 109 B.C. the Roman senate C. Metellus took reinforcements and supplies to Africa

and refused an attempt by Jugurtha to negotiate; he invaded Numidia and defeated Jugurtha in the field, and by 108 B.C. he reduced Numidia .

Jugurtha was defeated on the river Muthul after an obstinate and skilful resistance, but once again Jugurtha recovered and succeeded in surprising the Roman camp and forcing Metellus into winter quarters and there were fresh negotiations but Metellus insisted on the surrender of the King's person . Jugurtha refused and appealed to his father-in-law king Bocchus of Mauretanis(Ancient name of the north-western angle of the African continent. Mauretania signified the land of the Mauri or Moors). In 108 B.C. Bocchus joined Jugurtha on condition that he received a third of Numidia. In 107 B.C Marius was called on by the vote of the Roman people to supersede Metellus with new reinforcements and

supplies. Bocchus decided to open negotiations with Marius and was soon persuaded to send envoys to Rome to seek the alliance of the Roman people.

Finally Jugurtha fell into an ambush and was conveyed a prisoner to Rome in 106 B.C. Two years later in 104 B.C. Jugurtha figured with his two sons in Marius's triumph and in the subterranean prison beneath the capital he was either strangled or starved to death.

(3)

Roman occupation of Numidia

The Jugurthine war was ended after the death of Jugurtha, and by the peace treaty between Bocchus and Rome, the western part of Numidia was given to Bocchus and the eastern part was made into a kingdom for Gauda (a half-brother of Jugurtha).

Gauda was succeeded by his son Hiempsal 2nd, but in 81 B.C. Hiempsal 2nd was driven from his throne by the Numidians themselves, or by Hiarbas (ruler of the Kingdom, supported by Gn. Domitius Ahenobarbus, the leader of the Marian party in Africa) and soon afterwards Pompey was sent to Africa by Sulla to reinstate Hiempsal (Sulla was a Roman general, politician and dictator, belonged to a minor and impoverished branch of the famous patrician Cornelian generals).

Hiempsal was succeeded by his son Juba 1st and during the civil wars at Rome he sided with Pompey, partly from gratitude because he had reinstated his father on his throne and partly from enmity to Caesar who had insulted him in Rome by pulling his beard. Furthermore S. Curio (Caesar's general in Africa) had proposed in 50 B.C. that Numidia should be sold to

colonists and the king reduced to a private station; all these things led him to side with Pompey.

In 49 B.C. Juba heavily defeated the Caesrean army in which Curio was slain; Juba's attention was distracted by a counter invasion of his territories by Bocchus the younger and sittiis but he rejoined the Pompeians with a large force and shared the defeat at Thapsus.

Numidia in the more restricted sense became for a short time a Roman province under the title of Africa Nova but after the battle of Actium it was restored to Juba 2nd (son of Juba's 1st) who had acquired the favour of Augustus. In 25 B.C. Juba 2nd was transferred to the throne of Mauretania including the whole western portion of the ancient Numidian monarchy as far as the river Ampsage. It was said that Augustus in 29 B.C. after mark Antony's death

gave Juba the hand of Cleopatra Selene (daughter of Antony and Cleopatra). Finally, in A.D. 6 the Gaetulians rose in a revolt which was suppressed by Cornelius Lentulus Cossus (Gaetulia was under Juba's control). Juba died in A.D. 24, leaving the kingdom to his son by Cleopatra Selene who bore in honour of his maternal ancestry the name of Ptolemy. In A.D. 40, Ptolemy was summoned to Rome by the Emperor Caius Caligula and murdered; finally Mauretania was annexed to Rome but the Roman authority was established only after a serious rising among the Mauri.

However, in 43 A.D. Claudius incorporated the kingdom into the Roman state at two provinces (Mauretania Tingitana and Mauretania Caesariensis); these provinces were governed until the time of Diocletian by imperial procurators and were

occasionally united for military purposes. Under Diocletian, Mauretania Tingitana was attached administratively to Spain with which it was in all respects closely connected. There were seven Roman colonies in Mauretania Tingitana and eleven in Mauretania Caesariensis, these were mostly military foundations situated on the coast and served the purpose of securing civilization against the inroads of the natives who were not suited for town life as in Gaul and Spain but were under the immediate government of the procurators retaining their own clan organization.

The Roman settlements were less frequent in the west and Mauretania Tingitana has yielded but scanty evidence of Roman civilization. On the whole, Mauretania was in a flourishing condition down to the irruption of the Vandals in A.D. 429.

Chapter six
Roman empire in north Africa

Before considering the history of northern Africa under Roman rule it is necessary to give some general account of Roman administrative and military practices. The Romans had a highly structured system of political government which evolved from absolute monarchy through a somewhat revolutionary period to a republic where an elected government and citizen power were at their zenith, but this did not last and an imperial structure followed, under this last system the relative political importance of the emperor and others varied enormously with personalities.

(1)

Roman senate and magistrates

It was recorded that the senate was the body which administered the affairs of Rome and its territories, declared war and made treaties, and promoted legislation or recommended bills to the popular

assemblies. Its power was at its height during the early republic but it was weakened during the late republic and very considerably diminished under the Empire.

Actually, the growth of Rome and her empire made it increasingly difficult for an intimate type of government, by democracy, to operate efficiently. During Sulla's reign the numbers of the senate were raised from 300 to 600 (between 82-79 B.C.), and he appointed some of his friends senators and increased the numbers of magistrates.

The supreme magistrates were the two consuls, they were appointed by election and held office for one calendar year; they had the right of speaking first in the senate and were among the chief initiators of legislation to the extent that if a consul said the auspices were unfavourable no business could be done. In an emergency they could be called upon by a

final decree of the senate to take any measures necessary to protect the state; they had the right to levy troops and any Roman armies operating in Italy were regularly commanded by them.

As we go down the hierarchy the function of magistrates becomes more specialized. Praetors who were the supreme magistrates at one early stage, now became the next step down from the consuls; their numbers rose from two to four in 227 B.C. when Sicily and Sardinia became provinces, and to six provinces in 197 B.C. when two Spanish provinces had been added, and to eight under Sulla. Their function was at first largely military but came to be mainly judicial and the urban praetor was the chief legal magistrate in Rome while the second praetor was in charge of foreigners.

Apart from the magistracies whose holders followed each other without a break there were two censors appointed by the senate from its numbers every five years to hold office for 18 months; their duties were to conduct a census, to supervise morals, to control the size of the senate by enrolling members not automatically qualified or if necessary expelling members and to decide who was a member of the equestrian order.

(2)

Roman Assemblies

The popular assemblies were summoned and presided over by the consuls; there were two types of assembly operating in the late republic, the army had one called the Comitia Centuriata, where voting was by the centuries of seniors and Juniors; this assembly gradually acquired political rights. The other was

called the Comitia Tributa which constituted an assembly either of the plebeians or of all the people where in either case voting was by tribes. The functions of both types of popular assembly were the election of magistrates and the passing or rejecting of bills submitted to these bodies; if passed they became law.

There were never any political parties either in the senate or the popular assemblies, and the republican politics hinged mainly round the names of the leading men at any one time but towards the end of the republic a fair number of senators called Optimates opposed others known as Populares; the first of these groups included very conservative members and moderate politicians, and the second group was more revolutionary and pressed for such measures as land reform and cancellation of personal debts.

From 89 B.C. the Italians were enrolled as Roman citizens and the Italian towns were classified as either Municipia or colonia which later spread to the provinces. Under the republic Municipia were not colonies but had alliance agreements with Rome; their citizens could marry Romans and would become Roman citizens if they went to live in Rome or if the town acquired voting rights. The Municipia could enter into legal contracts with Romans without depending on international law and they undertook to provide troops for Rome but for internal administration were allowed free choice, only being visited once a year by Roman prefects to see that all was in order.

Roman Law

In 451 – 450 B.C. the twelve tables were published, laying down prohibitions and specifying the penalties for them. The procedure in civil law where private individuals were suing and being sued was unusual; first there was a preliminary hearing at which a praetor established what the dispute was and appointed a judge, agreed by both sides, to decide it. However, since this judge was not necessarily a legal expert, a body of such experts grew up to advise the judges; these were for long mostly nobles and they had great influence on the collection of a body of legal opinion based on precedent.

In criminal law, crimes against the person were tried by a praetor or other magistrate with advisers while

crimes against the state were tried before a public assembly.

There were three points about Roman law which showed discrimination; one was that women and aliens had few legal rights and slaves none; women could not plead in court and the amounts they could legally inherit were limited. The second was the frequency of legal fictions if for example it was thought desirable that a corporation or a foreigner should be party to a case strictly limited to citizens then by a fiction they could be deemed to be citizens for that purpose.

The third point was that there was no such thing as a sentence of a term of imprisonment: prisons were for debtors until their debt was discharged or recalcitrants or for persons awaiting trial or execution.

Roman citizenship was acquired by birth and by domicile or by a decree of the people or the emperor. For acquisition by birth either both parents had to be citizens or one citizen and one a foreigner whose community had an alliance agreement with Rome.

Acquisition by domicile came with extension of boundaries or change of status. After the social war 91–87 B.C. all men in Italy south of the Po valley became Roman citizens, and when Julius Caesar incorporated Cisalpine Gaul, the Roman citizenship extended to free men in recognized *coloniae* and *Municipia* in the provinces.

During the empire there was a tendency for the more important men in the provinces to take on imperial administrative appointments and thus acquire Roman citizenship. The Emperor Claudius allowed certain Gallic chieftains to stand for Roman magistracies and

soldiers recruited from the provinces into the auxiliary forces acquired citizenship when they were honourably discharged so that the numbers of citizens were constantly growing. Finally in 212 A.D. while the status of local communities was not changed, all free men in the empire became Roman citizens.

(4)

Roman Army

In the earliest age of Rome the army was a national or citizen levy such as we find in the beginnings of all states; this grew into the republican army of conquest which gradually subdued Italy and the Mediterranean world. A citizen army of infantry varying in size with the needs of each year, it eventually developed into a mercenary force with long service and professional organization; this became the imperial army of defence which developed from a strictly citizen army

into one which represented the provinces as well as Italy and was a garrison rather than a field army.

The assaults of the Barbarian horsemen compelled both the creation of a field force distinct from the frontier garrisons and the inclusion of a large mounted element which soon counted for much more than the infantry. Earlier the Roman army had been one of foot soldiers but in its latest phase it was marked by that predominance of horseman which characterized the earlier centuries of the middle ages. The history of the earliest Roman army in both ill-recorded and contaminated with much legend and legal fiction. We read of a primitive force of 300 riders and 3,000 foot soldiers in which the horseman counted for almost everything, but the numbers are clearly artificial and invented while the pre-eminence

accorded to the cavalry had no sequel in later Roman history.

According to the organization ascribed to Servius Tullius, the Roman army of the first stage included all citizens from 17 to 60 years of age, those under 47 for service in the field and the older men for garrison duty in Rome. The soldiers were grouped at first by their wealth (that is, their ability to provide their own horses, armour, etc.) into cavalry, heavy infantry, a remainder which it would be polite to call light infantry and some artificers, but the heavy infantry counted for most; and the men were enrolled for a year.

The second stage, it was some changes in the Roman army which are difficult to trace in detail. Gamillus introduced the beginnings of pay and long service which improved the armour and weapons also

abolished the phalanx and substituted for it an open order based on small subdivisions. This army broke in succession the stout native soldiers of Italy and the mountaineers of Spain and overthrew the trained Macedonian phalanx but it failed against Hannibal. As for the organism of The Roman army in this stage (according to Polybius) its elements were: first, the principal unit was the legion, generally a division of 4,500 men (3,000 heavy infantry, 1,200 light-armed, 300 horses), though sometimes including as many as 6,000 men. The heavy infantry were the backbone of the legion, they were levied from the whole body of Roman citizens who had some private means and who had not already served 16 campaigns and in effect formed a yeoman force. They had a large shield, metal helmet, leather cuirass, short Spanish thrusting and cutting sword. The light-armed were armed with

javelins and the cavalry seem to have been of little account.

The officers of the legion consisted of six tribunes (in part elected by the comitia, in part appointed by the consuls, and holding command in rotation); they were either veteran officers, sometimes even ex-magistrates or young noblemen beginning their career. The officers also consisted of sixty centurions, each commanding one century or rather a pair commanding each manipule and they were chosen by the tribunes among the veteran soldiers serving at the time and were arranged in a complicated hierarchy. Finally they consisted of standard-bearers and other under-officers.

Secondly, besides the legions (composed of citizens) the Roman army included contingents from the Italian allies (Socii) subjects of Rome; these

contingents appear to have been large, and the men were armed and drilled like the legionaries but they served not in legions but in cohorts (smaller units of 400 – 500 men) and their conventional positions seem to have been on the wings of the legions. They were principally infantry but included also a fairly large proportion of cavalry. Thirdly, besides the legionaries and *Socii*, the Roman army included non-Italian troops of special kinds, Balearic slingers, Numidian horsemen, Rhodians, Celtiberians and others.

Towards the end of the republic many changes began to work themselves out in the Roman army. The growth of Rome as a wealthy state tended to wreck the old theory that every citizen was a soldier, and favoured a division of labour between the merchant and the military while increasing complexity of war required a longer training and a more professional

soldier. In consequence the old restriction of legionary service to men with some spot of property was abolished by Marius about 104 B.C. and the legionaries became wholly proletariate and professionals.

Third stage (the imperial army of defense): the evils of the civil wars (49 – 31 B.C.) furnished the first emperor Augustus with both the opportunity and the necessity for reforming the army; the main lines of his work were simple and the imperial army consisted of two classes or grades of troops about equal in numbers if unequal in importance; the first grade was the legions (recruited from Roman citizens) whether resident in Italy or in the provinces, the second was formed by the Auxilia (recruited from the subjects of the empire in the provinces) organized in cohorts and corresponding somewhat to both the Socii and the

Auxiliaries of the republican army. There were also in Rome special household troops and a large body of Vigiles who were both fire brigade and police.

Concerning the troops, the supreme command was no longer in the hands of the six tribunes but was in the hands of a legatos legion's deputy of the general and a man usually of senatorial rank and position, in the meantime. The six tribunes assisted him in theory but in practice they were little more than young men of good birth learning their business. The real officers of the legion were the 60 centurions (men who generally rose from the ranks and who knew their work); and the senior centurion was an especially important officer and on retirement frequently became camp adjutant or obtained other promotion. Below the centurions were under-officers, standard-bearers, clerks and the like.

Besides the legions Augustus developed a new order of Auxilia, these auxiliaries provided both the whole of the archers and nearly the whole of the cavalry of the army; they also included many foot regiments, and the men who served in these units were less well paid and served longer than the legionaries.

There were some changes during the period between the third and fourth stage; two principal causes brought gradual change to the Augustan army, in the first place, the pax Romana brought such prosperity to many districts that they ceased to provide sufficient recruits. And secondly, the old days of mere frontier defence were over and the Barbarians began to beat on the walls of the empire as early as 160 A.D. and by 250 A.D. they came in ever-growing numbers on horseback bringing new tactics for the Roman infantry to face.

The fourth stage: the results were seen in the reforms of Diocletian and Constantine the Great in 284 A.D. New frontier guards were established and the old army was reorganized in field forces which accompanied or might accompany the emperors in war.

The importance of the legions dwindled; the chief soldiers were the mercenaries, mostly Germans, enlisted from among the barbarians and new titles appear and it becomes plain that in many points the new order is not the old and the details of the system were complicated as was all the administrative machinery of that age.

Finally, under the republic we do not find or expect to find any central body which was especially entrusted with the development of the army system or military

finance or military policy in war; even under the empire there was no such organization.

The emperor as commander-in-chief and his more or less unofficial advisers doubtless decided questions of policy but the army was so much a group of provincial armies that much was left to the chief officers in each province.

(5)

Roman influence in north Africa

Cyrenaica, which was governed by a Libyan governor was sent out from Egypt, was again separated from Egypt by the decision of the Romans who resolved the dispute between Ptolemy 6th Philometor and his brother Ptolemy 7th Euergetes 2nd in 163 B.C. by granting the latter an independent realm in Cyrenaica.

In 162 B.C. when Euergetes went on a mission to Rome; leaving Cyrene under the control of an Egyptian general (Ptolemy Sympetesis), the Cyrenaeans rose in revolt and were joined not only by the local Libyans but also by Sympetesis himself. Euergetes returned was able, though with great difficulty, to restore his control over Cyrene and he continued to rule there until the death of his brother Philometor in 145 B.C. when he returned to Egypt to take the throne, thus reuniting Cyrenaica once again to Egypt.

The final separation of Cyrenaica from Egypt came, as has been seen, with the death of Euergetes 2nd in 116 B.C. and by his will, Euergetes bequeathed Cyrenaica to his illegitimate son Ptolemy Apion.

Apion ruled Cyrenaica for twenty years and died without heirs in 96 B.C. leaving a will by which he

bequeathed his kingdom to the people of Rome. The Romans, however, had no desire to undertake responsibility for the administration of Cyrenaica and contented themselves with sending agents to take over ownership of the royal estates there. Restoring self-government to the Greek cities, but the Greeks of Cyrenaica displayed their usual capacity for misgovernment and civil strife and a leader called Nikokrates seized power in Cyrene and ruled the city until assassinated by his own brother Leandros whose rule was no improvement. The political opponents of Leandros brought about his downfall by string up a war of the local Libyans against him and them treacherously delivering him up to the chief of the Libyans. In 87 B.C. a Roman general arrived in Cyrenaica to seek military assistance for a war in

Greece; he restored order and at the request of the Cyrenaeans, enacted constitutional reforms.

Finally the Romans annexed Cyrenaica in 74 B.C. which was administered separately from Egypt and after the Roman annexation of Crete in 67 B.C. both cities were combined together to form a single province.

The Greek cities of Cyrenaica retained their municipal autonomy under the Romans and remained Greek in language and culture; they also benefited from effective Roman action against the Libyan tribes. Apart from these campaigns against the Libyans Cyrenaica seemed to have presented few military problems to the Romans and the province was normally garrisoned only by a small force of non-Roman auxiliary troops.

Economically, Cyrenaica became dependent upon stock-breeding and its wealth was lost during the first century of Roman rule .

In the west, the Roman established their rule with the annexation of the remaining territory of Carthage as the province of Africa and the second Roman province was added with the annexation of the eastern Numidian kingdom of Jubal 1st which was called Africa Nova. After the death of king of western Numidia the emperor Augustus united the two provinces together with the previously independent coastal cities of Tripollitania to form a single province called Africa Proconsularies. Tripolitania and north-west Africa continued to present military problems to the Romans throughout the period of their rule as they sought to protect the areas which they held against the incursions of the largely nomadic peoples

of the interior, here, several campaigns were fought by governors of Africa proconsularis in the early years of Augustus. A part from a raid on Lepcis Magna by the Garamantes in 69 A.D., serious trouble seemed to have been largely restricted to Mauretania, where there were major risings in 118 – 122 A.D. and 144-152 A.D.

In Tripolitania the extension of permanent military occupation into the interior was undertaken only under the emperor Septimius Severus from 193 A.D. to 211 A.D.(Severus was Roman emperor, and he was born of an equestrian family at Leptis Magna on the coast of Africa). Numerous small forts were established in the immediate hinterland and three isolated outposts deep in the interior at Cydamus (Ghadames), Gheria El- Garbia and Bu Njem which

guarded the approaches to Tripolitania from the Fezzan .

Roman colonization:

The Roman colonization in north-west Africa began in 122 B.C. when it was proposed to settle landless Roman citizens from Italy at the deserted site of Carthage. Some of the settlers arrived and were allowed to retain their allotments of land in the Carthage area; subsequent Roman colonization involved principally the settlement of demobilized soldiers from the Roman army .

After 46 B.C. Caesar made further settlements of military veterans in Africa while his ally Sittius settled his soldiers at Cirta and elsewhere in Numidia. Caesar also projected the foundation of a Roman colony on the site of Carthage but this was carried out only after his assassination in 44 B.C. Later, the new Carthage

grew to be the largest city in north-west Africa and became the capital of the province of Africa Proconsularis.

The Roman colonization in north-west Africa took the form of the settlement of Romans in existing Phoenician or native townships rather than the establishment of completely new communities. The Phoenician culture of north-west Africa for some time showed considerable tenacity and Punic remained the official language of several north African towns well into the first century A.D. and unofficial Punic inscriptions survive from even later including some of the fourth century A.D. in the Latin alphabet.

Under the impact of Roman colonization and assimilation, the civilization of north-west Africa gradually lost the Phoenician character which it had acquired under Carthaginian domination, and Latin

gradually replaced Punic as the language of the urban centres.

The north African townships adopted municipal constitutions of Roman type and were reconstructed in Roman style with public baths, amphitheatres for gladiatorial shows and aqueducts to supply fresh drinking water.(concerning Roman baths: it had become a recognized feature of Roman life and under the empire their numbers increased until the beginning of the 4th century A.D.; they were of the type of the Turkish bath with some at different temperatures).

Roman temples:

The Roman temples in north Africa differed in many important respects from those of the Greeks. For the comparatively low style base with its three steps all round, the Romans substituted a high platform or

podium with a flight of steps on the entrance façade; moreover, while the Greek temples were isolated from other buildings and almost always face east and west, those of the Romans usually face the forum or are placed at the end of a street to close a vista and are turned to all points of the compass, their orientation being governed by their relation to other building. This results in an increased emphasis on the entrance façade with an increased depth to the portico; the cellar is wider and the colonnade which surrounds the Greek temple is often reduced to a row of engaged columns or pilasters along the cellar walls except on the entrance front.

The Basilicas were large covered halls facing the forum, affording protection from the weather and giving space for the holding of courts of justice and for banking and other commercial transactions, all of

which activities had in earlier days been carried on in the open market-place .

Roman theatres:

The Roman theatres differed in several respects from the Greek; the auditorium was not excavated and the walls surrounding stage and seating were continuous, the entrance to the orchestra being by vaulted passages. As the chorus no part in the Roman theatre the orchestra or dancing space was not required and became part of the auditorium.

Triumphal Arches and Gateways:

More usual than the triumphal column, as exemplified by those of Trajan and Marcus Aurelius, is the triumphal arch commemorating some important event or campaign, this is most commonly an isolated monument not necessarily spanning a roadway. The triumphal arch was usually decorated with columns

and bas-reliefs of the chief events it commemorated as was frequently surmounted by a group of sculpture. The monumental city gate while sometimes serving a commemorative purpose differs from the arch in being part of the defences of the city and meant to be used.

Indeed, north Africa was principally important to the Roman empire as a source of corn and for the production of olive-oil; by the systematic construction of wells and irrigation canals, the Romans effected a substantial expansion of the area under cultivation, principally in Numidia and Africa Proconsularis also in Mauretania and Tripolitania. Moreover the Romans developed trade with the areas outside their formal control in the interior; from the hinterland of Mauretania they obtained principally cedar-wood and wild animals of various kinds for slaughter in the

Games. Mauretania was also an important source of ivory-hunting to supply Roman demands which led to the diminishing of the elephant population of north-west Africa.

In Tripolitania, Lepcis Magna and the other coastal cities developed a lucrative trade across the desert with the Garamantes of the Fezzan. They imported from the Garamantes the precious stones known as carbuncles and also ivory from the Sudan.

Chapter Seven
The decline of the Roman Empire
in north Africa

The beginning of the decline began during the reign of Gordianus. He was an extremely wealthy man and descended from the Gracchi and Trajan. Gordianus was appointed by Alexander Severus as governor of Africa and during his proconsulship there were disturbances inside the province of Africa Proconsularis ; these began with a rising at the town of Thysdrus against excessive exactions by the imperial tax-collectors which later in 235 A.D. broadened into a rebellion against the emperor Maximinus . By 238 A.D. Gordianus was proclaimed emperor by the insurgents; this initiated a general rebellion against Maximinus throughout the empire and Maximinus was finally overthrown .

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The overthrow of the emperor Maximinus in 238 A.D. was followed by half a century of instability and civil war as rival claimants fought for the position of

emperor and these internal disorders were exploited by hostile neighbours of the empire who seized the opportunity to raid or even to annex its frontier provinces. In north-Africa the sole legion in the Roman garrison Legio 3rd Augusta was dissolved after the fall of Maximinus as a punishment for its role in the defeat of Gordianus in 238 A.D. and the defence of the Roman provinces in north-west Africa was left entirely to auxiliary forces.

During the period between 238, 253 the area under Roman occupation was reduced and the outposts of Castellum Dimmidi and Numidia and the forts at Ghadames, Gheria El-Garbia and Bu Njem in the hinterland of Tripolitania were abandoned.

Under the reign of emperor Diocletian 284-305 A.D. who restored order and a systematic reorganization of the empire, trouble of a different character was

represented by a revolt of the Roman governor of Africa in 304-305 A.D. in suppressing which the imperial forces sacked the towns of Carthage and Citra. Furthermore the provinces were reduced in size by subdivision and military and civil authority in the provinces was separated.

Cyrenaica was divided into two parts, Libya exterior in the west which was administered from Ptolemais and Libya interior in the east which was administered from Paraetonium. As for the provinces of Africa Proconsularis (Numidia and Mauretania Caesariensis were combined to form the diocese of Africa); Proconsularis were divided into three new provinces: the northern portion including the capital Carthage became the province of Zeugitana, the southern portion became the province of Byzacena and administered from Hadrumetum, and Tripolitania

became a separate province with its capital at Lepcis Magna. Mauretania Caesariensis was divided into two provinces and the eastern portion became the separate province of Mauretania Sitifensis and was administered from Sitifis.

Numidia was also divided by Diocletian, the north became the province of Numidia Cirtensis with its capital at Citra, while the south became Numidia Militiana and was administered from legionary headquarters at Lambaesis. As for Mauretania Tingitana, which was not divided, it was attached to the diocese of Spain which had military responsibility for it.

The end of Roman empire

The installation of a barbarian king in Italy

Under the three months rule of Maximus, the Vandals under Gaiseric invaded Italy and sacked Rome .

From 456- 472 the actual ruler of Italy was Ricimer, the Suebe; but of the four emperors whom he placed on the throne, Majorian (457 – 461) alone played any imperial part outside Italy, and two years later after the death of Ricimer in 472 Orestes attempted to fill his place, but the Barbarian mercenaries in Italy determined to secure for themselves a position there such as that which their kinsfolk had won in Gaul and Spain and Africa but their demand for a third of the lands of Italy was refused by Orestes; however, they instantly rose in revolt. On the defeat and death of

Orestes they proclaimed their leader, Odoacer the Rugian, king of Italy.

The installation of a barbarian king in Italy was the natural climax of the changes which had been taking place in the west throughout the 5th century. In Spain, Gaul and Africa barbarian chieftains were already established as kings, and in Italy for the last 20 years, the real power had been wielded by a barbarian officer.

When Odoacer decided to dispense with the nominal authority of an emperor of the west, he placed Italy on the same level of independence with the neighbouring provinces but the old ties with Rome were not severed. In Italy, as in Spain and Gaul, the laws, the administrative system and the language remained Roman but the emancipation of Italy and the western provinces from direct imperial control which was

signalized by Odoacer's accession has rightly been regarded as marking the opening of a new epoch. It made possible in the west the development of a Romano-German civilization; it facilitated the growth of new and distinct states and nationalities, also it gave a new impulse to the influence of the Christian church and laid the foundations of the power of the bishops of Rome.

part Three
Byzanitines and Vandals

Most of the modern historians prefer to identify the eastern half of what was once the Roman empire as the Byzantine empire, but from the beginning this eastern half of the empire had never been a truly Roman partner to the west. Indeed, of all the provinces, these to the east were the least Roman of all; they had fiercely opposed Roman conquest and as provinces they had steadfastly resisted Romanization and at the same time the cultures of the two halves of the empire were and remained different; their economies were not complementary nor was travel between the two easy or frequent. It is clear by the general view that the loss of the western half of the empire represented the end of the Roman empire; that when the Roman west fell, the empire fell, and it was only the non-Roman (the eastern half) that survived. Its emperors might call themselves Roman Caesars

until 1453 and perhaps Roman legal traditions might remain strong there until the end.

The Vandals

(the term Vandals used by early writers only as a collective designation for a group of Teutonic tribes including the Burgundians and the Goths. They first came into contact with Romans during the Marcomannic war) .

However, in A.D. 406 , the Vandals moved westward and crossing the Rhine at Mainz proceeded towards Gaul. Owing to defeat at the hands of the Franks, the Vandals could not settle in Gaul and in 409 their King Gunderic led them across the Pyrenees. They appear to have settled in Spain in two detachments, one was the Asdingian Vandals whom occupied Galicia, and the other was the Silingian who occupied Andalusia . The Silingian Vandals were well-nigh exterminated

during the next 20 years but their Asdingian brethren marched across Spain and took possession of Andalusia .

Upon an invitation received by the king of the Vandals from Bonifacius (count of Africa) in 428, the whole nation set sail for Africa (80,000 persons) and they were transported to Africa in ships supplied by Bonifacius. Gunderic (the king of the Vandals) was now dead and supreme power was in the hands of his brother Gaiseric who was for 50 years the terror of Constantinople and Rome. Although Gaiseric soon returned to the imperial allegiance, only three cities of Roman Africa (Carthage, Hippo and Cirta) remained untaken by the vandals up to 430 .

By 435 Augustine was dead and succeeded by Valentinian 3rd who in 442 signed a peace treaty with Gaiseric. Under the treaty, the emperor was to retain

Carthage and the small but rich proconsular province in which it was situated while Hippo and the other six provinces of Africa were abandoned to the Vandals. Gaiseric observed this treaty no longer than suited his purpose, and in October 439 he suddenly attacked and took Carthage. The Vandal occupation of this great city, the third among the cities of the Roman empire, lasted for 94 years.

It is believed that Gaiseric seemed to have counted the years of his sovereignty from the date of its capture; henceforward he made of Carthage a pirate's stronghold, whence he issued forth to attack the dwelling of the men with whom God is angry.

Almost alone among the Teutonic invaders of the empire he set himself to form a powerful fleet and was probably for 30 years the leading maritime power in the Mediterranean. Gaiseric's celebrated expedition

against Rome in 455, undertaken in response to the
cell of Eudcia (widow of Valentinian) was only the
greatest of his marauding exploits. He took the city
without difficulty and for 14 days in a calm and
business-like manner, emptied it of all its movable
wealth.

Indeed, there does not seem to be in the history of the
capture of Rome by the Vandals any justification for
the charge of willful and objectless destruction of
public buildings which is implied in the word
Vandalism. It is probable that this charge grew of the
persecution which was carried on by Gaiseric and his
son against the Catholic Christians. The bishops were
almost universally banished and the congregations
were forbidden to elect their successors, so that the
greater part of the churches of Africa remained
widowed for a whole generation.

In 467 at the very close of Gaiseric's life, a treaty was signed between Gaiseric and the eastern emperor. The treaty concluded that the bishops were permitted to return and there was then a short lull in the persecution but on the death of Gaiseric in 477 and the accession of Hunneric it broke out again.

It was believed that much of what was known of the policies of the Vandal rulers in north Africa came from hostile clerical chroniclers and concerned their struggle to repress the former catholic aristocracy. Both Gaiseric and his son and successor Hunneric (447 – 484) aimed at maintaining the Arian interpretation of Christianity as their Vandal religion. In common with other Germanic tribes during the fourth century they had accepted Arianism from missionaries from the Danube provinces of the empire

and it now served to distinguish them from the great majority of their north Africa subjects.

During the reign of Hunneric the Romans had recovered some lost ground and the Vandals were not too concerned about the situation outside the area they had reserved for their own settlement. On the death of Hunneric in 484 he was succeeded by his cousin Gunthamund (Gaiseric had established seniority among his own descendants as the law of succession to his throne), who ruled the empire until his death in 496 and was then succeeded by his brother Thrasamund (496 – 523).

On the death of Thrasamund, Hilderic (523 – 531) the son of Hunneric and Eudocia succeeded to the throne; he adhered to the creed of his mother rather than of his father and in spite of a solemn oath sworn to his predecessor that he would not restore the catholic

churches to their owners, he at once proceeded to do so and to recall the bishops. Hilderic, however, was very unpopular with his subjects and after a reign of eight years he was thrust into prison by his cousin Gelimer in 531 who ruled till 534.

Vandal population was small in comparison with that of the Romans in Africa and included too few individuals able to administer their territories; they employed some of the Romans local aristocracy who were nearly always Catholics. By the first decade of the sixth century, the Vandals were beginning to be absorbed into the mass of the Afro-Latin population. In this respect, the religious and social history of north Africa resembled that of Burgundy, Spain and Italy at this period; there was a further point of resemblance between north Africa and the barbarian successor states in the western Roman empire, namely the

astonishing vigour of the Latin language. But in the meantime, the Vandal Africa produced poets such as Luxorius and Dracontius and even humble versifiers who found scope for reminiscences of Virgil on their tombs.

The Vandal challenge awoke in the north African provincials a sense of cultural identity expressed through the Latin language and silent adherence to the Roman empire represented by the emperor at Constantinople.

Significant changes were taking place in the social and economic life of north-west Africa which were to prevent Catholicism from regaining the power it possessed on the eve of the Vandal invasion and Latin from becoming the basis of a Mediterranean African language.

End of the Vandals

As mentioned earlier, Hilderic helped the Romans of the east to overthrow the Vandal dominion from north Africa, as a result he was thrust into prison by his cousin Gelimer. In March 533 a great expedition under the command of Belisarius reached Africa from the Roman east. The landing of Belisarius was unopposed and he marched rapidly towards Carthage and in September 533 defeated Gelimer at Ad Deximum (10 miles from Carthage); on the following day he entered Carthage but he was too late to save the life of Hilderic who had been slain on his rival's orders as soon as the news came of the landing of the imperial army. In the meantime, a large force of

Vandals was occupied in Sardinia under Gelimar's brother Tzazo.

Tzazo decided to return to Africa to help his brother against the Romans; on his return from Sardinia a force was collected but the Vandals were defeated and Gelimer took flight and sought refuge in a mountain fortress called Papua on the Numidian frontier. There, after enduring great hardships in the squalid dwellings of the Moors he surrendered to his pursuers in March 534. after this, the Vandals disappeared from history and the overthrow of their kingdom rendered the spread of Saracen conquest along the northern shore of Africa in the following century.

Finally by 550 Byzantine authority had been extended to cover Tripolitania with a great fortress far to the south of Lepcis at Zuila, most of Byzacena to the line of the Tunisian Chotts and westwards to the boundary

of Mauretania Sitifensis with outposts along the coast still further west. In the meantime, new and heavy taxes were imposed and a draconian land survey was carried out to ensure that the provincials paid for defence and administration.

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